Precedent

[Occhidiangela]

I expect some dissenting views to this, and am interested in opinions on how it looks from a non-emotional and different perspective than my own.

A precedent for the current action was set in Serbia, for 71 days, when NATO elected, without a UN Security Council Resolution, to bomb a sovreign natioin in pursuit of a political end, which aim was a better long term outcome vis a vis the troubles in the Balkans. The French were on board, the Germans, and I noted that the Russians, who have historic and ethnic ties to the Serbs, were unwilling to shoot a 'silver bullet' objection with the Americans due to

1) Milosevic being a jerk
2) they had other problems that warranted not going to full stop with the US over.
3) they did not get a vote

A sovreign right was exercised by a coalition of sovreign states, all of whom conveniently had a pre-existing treaty and military structure that made it easy to act. The immigration of Slavs into nice European neighborhoods was a security concern, as was the concern for either human rights, or the appearance that defending human rights was a good enough fig leaf to cover the real reasons behind the action!

Before you try to take me to task over that little shot: I spent three years briefing, once or twice per month, official NATO briefs to a variety of public audiences in which NATO's official public position to European security threats 'after the Bear' was proclaimed to include =and believe me the wording was minced to death= "water rights, water and food shortages, overpopulation, and large scale immigration." Security Threats, which NATO has realigned itself to address beyond Article 5 protections. While the briefs I gave were aimed at Northern Africa and the Mid East, particularly Turkey's neighbors and the Magreb, as the source of instability, it was striking to see how that logic was applied in re Former Yugoslavia. Also see the problems the Germans and Italians had with illegal Albanian, Croatian, etc. immigration. Milosevic's heavy handed policies made him an easy target, for sure, and even with 'success' the 'Peacekeepers' are STILL in Kosovo, Bosnia, ad nauseum. More on that point later.

Fast forward a few years and follow this precedent to where a coalition of sovreign states use UN Security Council actions from 1991 to 2002 (1441 being the latest in that litany) as a basis for action, and put together a plan of action to address a threat to regional stability, the region being on NATO's boundaries, as was Yugoslavia. But of course, the picture is a bit fuzzier, it is not just a NATO concern, and the past five month's rhetoric has exposed a variety of views on this case. No two cases are alike.

The French, who got a vote last time without a Security Council resolution, did not want to play for their own sovreign reasons. Their right not to act is valid, all carping in Washington these days aside. The Russians did not want to play for their own sovreign reasons. As well the Germans and Chinese, all of whom exercise their sovreign power to do what they think is right, to act or not to act.

I think that if you "follow the money" you will find that Serbia had nowhere near the economic importance of Iraq. Every government of the Western Model, and some not so inclined, gets its ear bent by businesses. This makes sense, as they are part of the government's constituency. So I am not surprised that French, German, Russian, and other businesses are voicing their concerns, powerfully, to their governments. They see a risk of loss, which could influence unemployment, etc.

There may be the fear among German, Dutch, French, and maybe even a few American, businesses that there is an audit trail to enabling Saddam's Gas/Germ/Nuke programs that will lead to them. The audit trail to Iran on such matters is no secret to some; it would not surprise me if the same was true in Iraq. William Safire, in the NY Times, outlined a recently reported and telling trail from China via France to Iraq on some shipments of chemicals that are banned under UN decrees. Here is where some American voices express disappointment in lack of collective UN action, and argue that it is an Ostrich like approach.

Of what worth is a law, they argue, or a UN decree, if it is not enforced? That question the opponents of the current action have not, to my view, answered with any merit. Be that as it may, each point of view has been presented over and over for some time now. Those who charge that the US did not lead this latest effort well can compare the current Administration with the administration in 1991 and make some points there about leading an international coalition into action. Funnily enough, there is an international coalition in action, of some 30 or so sovreign nations.

The coalition that is acting is far more diverse than the NATO alliance, of course, and includes some VERY interesting players. (to me)

Iceland (They have no military forces to speak of. NATO member.)
Azerbaijan
Spain (Main area of support appears to be, like what I hear from Canada, post conflict humanitarian support of the Iraqi populace)
Australia
Camaroon
Netherlands
Italy
Uzbekistan (I think I recall them being on the list)
Saudi Arabia (no surprise)
Qatar (ditto)

There are more.

Is the absence of the French and Russians significant? Short term, no, long term, yes. Ego bruising and all that aside, the attempts for the past 14 years to create a more cohesive, not less cohesive, North Atlantic collective security structure, which includes the Russians, may be harmed by the current action. We shall see.

What I find interesting is the rhetoric that this action is somehow "incorrect" yet the bombing of Serbia was "correct." Saddam is as big a jerk as Milosevic, possibly bigger, and his country has an economic impact on an entire region, possibly even on the whole world, that dwarfs the influence of Serbia. In fact, Serbia only had any impact on some parts of Europe, and early on made plenty of moves that were not the least bit subtle. Saddam at least is a bit cleverer than Milosevic, and has more leverage with many multinational concerns that boil down to real money, which interests many governments who find economic element germane in determining their national courses of action.

A good arguement can be made that Serbia and Iraq are not identical issues, of course, since Milosevic was continuing in his skullduggery, be it overt or covert, which claim could be made in re Iraq, but apparently has not been made to the international diplomatic-media-complex attendant lack of real risk for corrective action presented to calm all fears.

Even though the problems are NOT identical, they are similar, and I have to ask:

Is it only acceptable to act collectively if local European security is the issue, and when there is little risk?

That is the cynical message I am getting from Paris and Berlin. If the role of bully/strongman can be played by everyone without internal political fluff against a country who is completely unable to act effectively, is that the sole criterion for collective action?

When there is no substantial risk? See also Haiti under Cedras, as regards return of Aristide.

If the stakes and risks are high enough, does that mean that inaction is the only course of action? Such a point of view strikes me as 'enabling behaviour.' The 'International Community' can be easily bluffed.

But that does not answer the critical question of collective security: is the UN, NATO, or any other international body to act only if it is a 'sure thing'? The U.S. or another wealthy nation/coalition such as France in some of the African troubles of late or NATO in re Yugoslavia, picks up much of the tab in any case.

In 1991, the UN, after massive prodding of Senior Pres Bush, acted collectively. The UN can act together, and with a will, see also Korea. Sainai and Cyprus peacekeeping missions continune, a self licking ice cream cone that has to sustain since departure of the peacekeepers is assumed, at present, to be a signal that hostilities will recommence. Peacekeeping is a Bandaid on a deep wound, in most places, though it is a collective action that can help create stability for a price. Yet some sort of peacekeeping force, or effort, seems to be in offing in post conflict Iraq. Is that the sole role the UN can and will play?

In any collective security action, some one, and it is NOT the Secretary General, has to act as the leader. (Is the Congo 1962 'UN pure?' Hmmm, need to look that one up) That single contemporary issue, which grew in importance when Boutros-Boutros Ghali lost American support, is a telling detail that "the UN as the only authority" folks forget insofar as the practical application of how the UN really gets anything done. It took sovreign nations to lead a coalition, as none of the UN members abdicate sovreignty upon joining the UN, so no Secretary General could by structure, even if he wanted to, lead the way. He can only use suasion of the gentlest means. His tools of force are at the mercy of their parent nations should they choose to recall them. He is almost powerless, in reality.

Which brings me to models of power. There is a current model that any nation state or international actor has four elements of political power

Diplomatic
Economic
Military/Force
Informational

Of the four, I suggest that diplomacy may be a false source of power, as it is enabled by the other three. When you have nothing backing up your negotiating position, be it force, economics, or information (in which area I put excellent ideas like the furthering of human rights) then it can boil down to a lot of wind. Diplomats can be skilled deal makers, but they have to have something to work with. See the other three elements of power. Those who argue that diplomacy is not a paper tiger may be correct, in that sometimes the process of sitting down and talking out differences presents a 'third way' or an area for compromise that two previously opposed sides would not have seen without engaging into dialogue. (Good example: Turkey and Greece just being in NATO together forced dialogue and they have not gone to war. I am sure there are other better examples) But dialogue, like force, has its own limits. See Israel/Palestein. Thus, the UN Secretary General, whose most precious tool is continued dialogue, has limits to his influence.

So who will lead, who will act, when action is warranted? Someone leading a sovreign nation has cajoled some 30 or more sovreign nations to act together in an effort to enhance long term security in the Middle East. The risk is that this action will have quite the opposite effect.

OPEC has already announced that producing nations, I saw this on the news last night, will ensure that world oil supply will remain stable. This points to two issues: oil is not the issue short term. There is enough out there with or without Iraq's reserves being pumped out of the ground, a long term concern for all producers.

So why the hesitation to act?

I see that fear is the prime issue, and a reluctance to admit that the way the world still works is in too many cases: might makes right. I may be reading this wrongly, but about 300+ years of enforcement of "freedom of the high seas" by various national navies tells me that I am at least partly right. Back to 'might makes right,' see bombing Serbia, and the various armed peacekeeping operations in the name of the UN. If peacekeepers did not need arms to do their job . . . would they even be useful or necessary? Armed force ushers in more variables, and creates more Chance in any geopolitical endeavour. The increasing of Chance makes many people uncomfortable, as the outcome is very uncertain, per my comments in the post "Be careful what you wish for."

Unwillingness to risk is a common theme, and I confess that I do not understand all of the subtle reasons of all the players who are not willing to risk more than a certain amount. But 30 or more nations are willing to risk that use of force can make a better long term outcome, just as 16 nations risked the same in Serbia.

Has this risk aversion been addressed effectively?

Truman risked war with USSR and China when he went to the aid of South Korea. Having watched both Messrs Blair and Straw for the last two weeks as they addressed the House of Commons, the answer is yes, in some cases. A good deal of the rhetoric on the American side has, in the words of ex-UK Foreign Minister Portillo, been an obstacle to the success of the diplomatic moves of the past year of so. Inelegant for sure, and very direct. And if Information is an element of power, as the model suggests, why does it appear that a lesser effort has been applied in that area? A good question, or merely a matter of style.

One might even say that the American message has been too clear and too simple for the clever and subtle minds of the international, including American, intelligensia. Even as straightforward a man as Secretary Powell has doubtless winced now and again at official utterances.

Imperfections aside, my question remains: is the objection and rhetoric against the current course of action really about "follow the money;" is it about "lack of style;" or is it about fear, and an unwillingness to risk for a future gain?

I think it is risk aversion first, money a close second, and style a distant third.

Kennedy risked in Cuba, and won, he risked in Viet Nam, and did not do quite so well. (Ask LBJ about being dealt that hand... oops, he's dead too.)

Thatcher risked in the Falklands, and won.

Bush, Sr, risked in Kuwait/Iraq, and succeeded.

Bush and Clinton both risked in Somalia, which move ran into a mess.

Lech Walesa risked in Poland, and won

The Slovenes risked versus Serbia, and won

Milosevic risked in Bosnia, and lost. Big.

Gorbachev risked with Peristroyka, and if not a real win or a lose outcome, he made a huge change in the world. As I see it, he helped preclude a nuclear WW III . . . for a while.

He who will not risk cannot win, says John Paul Jones, and more importantly, he who will not risk cannot change that which needs changing.

[The Luminaire]

Of what worth is a law, they argue, or a UN decree, if it is not enforced?

Its only enforced if it suits the needs of the parties involved. Sad but true, the "Laws", or "Resolutions" in either case, all become relative in the eye of the beholder.

Of what worth is a law, they argue, or a UN decree, if it is not enforced?

Exact same situation. The parties involved decided they had something more to gain, or in the current case, soemthing to lose, that would thereby sway their views one way or another. For the furtherment of whatever the hell an isses is, they'll swing one way or another.

If you look at the UN descision process, since Russia was admitted to the whole gathering, they have never ceased to do exactly that. Same thing with the french. I dont mean to be derogatory to the french people in general, nor the russians. Ive got very good friends coming from both cultures, but it stands that the leadership of those countries arent willing to move on issues unless there is a direct benfit, or on the other end of the spectrum, an extreme harm to come. With little thought towards the climate of world relations, or what effect their descisions may have on issues to come.

Like you said, the greatest risk of all is risking naught at all.

*edit* woo, spelling. :)

[Occhidiangela]

That appealing to the UN is not the first step of any government, but is awlays an option of any government when they run into a difficulty with a third party.

What I never read in the Charter was the requirement to only accept the UN as final authority, which would imply that a measure of sovreignty is forfeited by becoming a member nation.

I have not read the Charter recently, and I think I will read it again. As it is not committed to memory, my memory goes back to the points it raised when I did some research about 10 years ago on the modes of blockade and embargo, and how that fit into multilateralism, an American security policy that has not changed since then, and attempts at 'bloodless persuasion' to resolve international dilemas.

[--Pete]

Hi,

In international dealings, as in so much else, the cost/benefit analysis applies. I don't need to tell you that. You ask if interference in the internal workings of a country should be just a matter of the risk. I think that, for the same reward, a lower risk makes the course of action more palatable. If the risk is nearly nil, than any slight perceived reward is sufficient.

In the case of Iraq, not only is the risk greater than in the Balkans (both militarily and economically), but the situation is not as clear cut. There is no civil war in Iraq at present. There is no "ethnic cleansing". There is no group whose life and rights need defending *at present*. So, either we are invading Iraq as retribution for past deeds or as a precautionary measure for future deeds. If for past deeds, why didn't we act then? Why wait till now? And how does our acting now address those past deeds? If as a precautionary measure, how probable is the need for our action? How imminent was the danger? How likely was it that diplomatic means, backed by a clear willingness to go to war if the diplomacy failed, would have achieved our objectives?

I still think that we took the right course, albeit perhaps too rapidly and definitely for the wrong reasons. However, if our intelligence proves to have been faulty (or invented by people who wished a war), then even the valid reasons will have been false. If the intelligence wasn't as near certain as intelligence could ever be, then we are at fault for not waiting, both to verify what we thought we knew and, incidentally, to give other means a chance to work.

I still support this war on the basis of the evidence presented, but only marginally. If it turns out that the American people were lied to, either because the intelligence presented was false or because it wasn't verified, then I will join the ranks calling for both the impeachment of Bush and his trial as an international terrorist. And that, too, is part of the risk/reward structure.

--Pete

[NuurAbSaal]

IIRC both Gulf War II in '91 and the action in Serbia/Kosovo were direct answers to
a: Iraq invading Kuwait
b: Milosevic's Special Police Forces killing and raping their way through the Albanian populace of Kosovo

The current attack on Iraq is based on basically nonexistant evidence of Saddam hoarding weapons of mass destruction.
{edit: Pete beat me to this one:)}


I have to admit I didn't understand 100% of your post due to lack of sleep/language knowledge, but I think it's safe to say the scenarios are substantially different.

Furthermore France, Germany et al were IMO only against direct military action because they (their govs), as did I, thought a non-violent solution still possible.

I can't comment on the UN stuff or US foreign policy since I do not have sufficient knowledge of the matter.

My two €
Nuur

P.S.: What exactly is the role of countries like Iceland or Kamerun in this coalition, aside from ensuring themselves a friendly attitude from US gov?

[--Pete]

Hi,

What exactly is the role of countries like Iceland or Kamerun in this coalition

While they cannot help militarily, they can take a stand as to the justice of the war. Support for a war effort by countries that are normally inclined to pacifism is, I think, much more sincere than opposition to a war by countries that have a financial ax to grind.

The current attack on Iraq is based on basically nonexistant evidence of Saddam hoarding weapons of mass destruction.
{edit: Pete beat me to this one:)}

Not quite. Evidence has been given, both by the USA and by the UN inspectors. It is *not* a question of evidence, it is a question of whether that evidence is real or a lie. If the evidence that *has* been given is true, then a war with Iraq was probably inevitable. To have waited under those circumstances would have been foolish, in that it would have given Saddam more time to prepare and bought those fighting against him nothing. If that evidence is a lie, then it becomes an important question for the USA to determine where that lie originated. If the lie was that "tentative" or "speculative" information was passed as "most probable", then those who passed it as such are guilty. If the "information" was fabricated whole, then those who did so are even more guilty. In either case, if the information was false, then it is the fault of the administration for accepting it without sufficient proof.

I seriously doubt that that information was intentionally falsified. I am less sanguine as to its real versus putative accuracy. But, as of right now (actually, as of Powell's presentation to the UN of a few weeks ago) I am convinced that the action taken by the USA is correct. Taken for the wrong reasons, possibly (even probably), but still correct.

--Pete

[Occhidiangela]

I do not believe that Secretary Powell would back a lie.

He has more cred with me than some others, but I do not believe that he would have made the case he did if he did not believe the evidence.

As I recall from some of what I have read, his entering position and general advice was _against_ war in 1991, while he was CJCS.

I doubt that recent years have made him more bellicose.

[--Pete]

Hi,

I do not believe that Secretary Powell would knowingly back a lie.

Yep, he still has some credence with me too. His background buys a lot of respect from me. But I don't completely exclude the possibility of his being the victim of a lie. I don't think that that is very probable, but neither do I consider it impossible.

--Pete

[NuurAbSaal]

I actually meant to elaborate on the issue of evidence but couldn't put it into a sentence that actually made sense. I should have deleted the entire paragraph, I apologize.
I agree with Occhi about Colin Powell, he is IMO (uninformed, again) by far the most competent and, for lack of a better word on my behalf, reasonable member of the Bush administration (I hope you understand what I mean).
However I see no reason to mistrust Blix and El (Al?) Baradei either and they stated on numerous occasions that no evidence of weapons of mass destrucion had been found in Iraq. I understand however that US Intelligence has probably a better view on the actual situation and I have to admit I didn't hear Mr Powell's speech, I only read about it. Then again I have no illusions about the public (you, me) knowing even remotely what is going on behind the scenes.
We're both being fed propaganda. A nice read on that subject:

Taylor, Philip M., "Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945"

If evidence has been made up we'll most likely never hear of it.

As for the coalition, I am pretty sure that at least some of the countries like Kamerun etc, were pressured into "joining". IMO they don't "take a stand for the justice of the war" as you put it but do what is best for them. Sad but probably true nonetheless.

No input on the difference of GW II/Serbia and GW III? I think this is rather important.

I'm afraid I won't be able to post again until about tomorrow evening.

G'Night
Nuur

[--Pete]

Hi,

I agree with Occhi about Colin Powell, he is IMO (uninformed, again) by far the most competent and, for lack of a better word on my behalf, reasonable member of the Bush administration (I hope you understand what I mean).

Indeed I do, too. He has always struck me as an intelligent, and more importantly, honest man. I was surprised that he was asked to join this administration and even more surprised that he accepted. I suspect that he did so because he saw it as another duty he could perform. That his, IMO, sane and rational analysis has lost him the ear of the president is nothing that surprises me in light of what this administration did about science advisers. Basically, the truth is of little value to ignorant bigots, and I consider most of the administration to fall into that group.

However I see no reason to mistrust Blix and El (Al?) Baradei either and they stated on numerous occasions that no evidence of weapons of mass destrucion had been found in Iraq.

That is not entirely true. It is a known and established fact that Iraq had capabilities for the development of both chemical and biological weapons and the manufacture of at least the chemical weapons. It is also a know fact that, at least at one time, Iraq had a nuclear weapons development program running and at least a few of the ultracentrifuges used in diffusion separation of weapons grade uranium. Part of the inspector's task was to determine what had happened to these capabilities. No information on this issue has been forthcoming, and if Saddam had indeed been disarming as the 1991 agreement required, I suspect he would have been more than happy to offer proof.

So, neither strong proof of armament nor of disarmament has been generated by the inspectors. If Saddam was arming, it would be easy enough to hide the facilities in a place as large as Iraq. If he was disarming, then it seems strange that he would not have offered proof, indeed have used any proof he could generate to make the USA look bad. So, while I don't deny the possibility that the evidence presented by the USA could be false, I do not consider the (mostly) lack of evidence from the inspectors to be of much use except to cast doubt on the usefulness of the inspection process.

Then again I have no illusions about the public (you, me) knowing even remotely what is going on behind the scenes.

While I have little doubt of the ability of governments to get away with lies for a time, and while I have little respect for the intelligence, honesty, or integrity of the media, in the long run I think the media's ability to dig is greater than the government's ability to cover. Eventually, I suspect that in almost all cases "the truth will out."

As for the coalition, I am pretty sure that at least some of the countries like Kamerun etc, were pressured into "joining". IMO they don't "take a stand for the justice of the war" as you put it but do what is best for them. Sad but probably true nonetheless.

Well, looking into the motives of these countries is difficult. However, I don't see what is sad about countries doing what is best for them. I think that that is what governments are supposed to do, look after the well being of the countries.

I'm afraid I won't be able to post again until about tomorrow evening.

Nice thing about a forum as opposed to a chat room, the discussion will still be here tomorrow ;)

--Pete

[Occhidiangela]

I have been looking for that word in my memory for three days.

It is a Russian word that we Americans might translate as "deception" or "grand deception."

I bring this up for the following reason. The Deception Plan. It is doctrine.

Sec Def Rumsfeld was heard to tell the media today, "you don't know our plan, and I am glad that you don't know our plan." Doubtless the usual grin accompanied this quip. (Some think he enjoys the game of media baiting too much.)

That little snippet floored me, and reminded me, for reasons unknown beyond caffeine deprivation, of that Russian term.

No Soviet Op Plan of any merit was absent maskirovka (if I spelt it wrong, please blast me, I cant find my old notes. Lost in a move, methinks.) The American Army in particular has a doctrine that virtualy requires any plan of significance to have a "grand deception" as an element. It is not an option, unless things are just too danmed easy, which in this modern world is not often. Self deception, ala Somalia or Vietnam, is of course common currency.

Is the immensely touted Shock and Awe Buzz Word Du Jour an enormous exercise in maskirovka? Is it merely an element of psychological warfare? Is it, to paraphrase a Styx album title, a Grand Illusion?

The Iraqi's are fully aware that US and friends can wreak massive havoc and destruction at will. The capability is simply there. Given 1991, they can credibly believe that we not only can, but with a seemingly simple minded leader in charge, will. Appearances are the key element in any sleight of hand, ask any stage magician.

Is Secretary Rumsfeld that clever?

What your post triggered in my Scotch enhanced brain this afternoon, as the kids played on the trampoline (Eureka moments know no bounds, even to a spotter!) was the inverse application of that thought: what if the liberals were right, and the deception was internal, not external? What if the deception plan is about two years old?

Jesus wept, I hope that thought is wrong. I had always thought that Pres Bush is, even if not an elegant orator, a man with his heart in the right place. If that thought is right, per your own misgivings, then Tricky D!ck Nixon was an amatuer. :o

[--Pete]

Hi,

Used against your enemies, Maskirovka is admirable, essential. All warfare is based on deception, Sun Tzu said that centuries ago. Machiavelli echoed it much later.

Used against your people, Maskirovka is abhorrent, self defeating. The USSR did that and it is no more. The Third Reich did that and it ended in flames. Closer to home we have Tricky #$%& himself.

Jesus wept, I hope that thought is wrong.

As do I. I would infinitely rather be wrong than have the USA suffer the repercussions if my misgivings prove true. While I consider them to be of low probability, the very fact that I can entertain them at all (for I am neither a conspiracy nut nor a paranoid) gives a strong indication of my opinion of this administration. Shrub may have his heart in the right place, but if his heart is motivated by "higher truths", then I for one do not trust him and would put nothing past him. History is full of those who did great evil in the name of good and god.

--Pete

[The Luminaire]

Im with you Pete, I dont think he'd *knowingly* back a lie.

That said, I dont know that either side of this debate is willingly revealing, or accepting the whole truth. They're choosing to interpret it from each sides respective views on how to deal with conflict.

Powell, being more strongminded, lets say, is more likely to interpret what he is given(Theres where that possible lie comes in)very starkly; a sort of black and white opinion. I can hear him saying it now, almost kubric-esqe, "Either we nuke the bastards, or they nuke us first." Gross exaggeration to be sure, not also not far from his point of veiw. :)

On the other side, take DeVellpin(Not clear on spelling :)), he is more likely to take a diplomatic stance regaurdless of the situation, as seems to be his nature. Its also more possible that he would *front* a lie, as opposed to simply playing to the tune of others, knowing or not. "UN inspectors really are doing their work, and accomplishing much good!" :P Again, grossly out of proportion, but still not far from the truth.

Oh, as a side note--we've proved that they did have weapons they were hiding, immeadiately falsifying any argument that the opposition had, as to inspectors rooting it all out. Hell, we even shot a few down :) If you cant see the truth from a patroit missile launcher, you are indeed blind. :)

*edit* Ive really got to proof-read my spelling *before* hitting enter :P

[--Pete]

Hi,

If you cant see the truth from a patroit missile launcher, you are indeed blind.

Oh, I don't know. Seems I remember some inflated claims of Patriots versus Scuds about 12 years ago. And I don't think I got a particularly "truthful" read on Vietnam from my view over twin 60s some thirty eight years ago.

Perhaps there is no truth. Or perhaps "in vino veritas" is the only truth we can know ;)

BTW, do a Google search on "in vino veritas" -- you'll get hits from nearly every language in the world. Who says Latin is dead ;)

--Pete

[Nystul]

On a light note, I've heard the phrase "shock and awe" on CNN so many times today that I'm seeing potential for a drinking game.

There is no doubt in my mind that chemical weapons will be found in Iraq. My bigger concern is how soon we "find" them, if you catch my meaning. As for what kind of evidence Bush administration et al. had going into this, we may all be dead before that info (or lack therof) is declassified....

[goldfish]

While Powell is a likable guy, and certainly has that honest appearance, I have run into enough tidbits here and there in the press to worry me a little about him.

From the Boston Globe (and I've seen this one elsewhere too, I thought it was in a Slate or WashPost article recently but can't seem to locate it):

"While past error is no indication of future action, the Kurds have not forgotten that Secretary of State Colin Powell was then the national security adviser who orchestrated Ronald Reagan's decision to give Hussein a pass for gassing the Kurds. #$%& Cheney, then a prominent Republican congressman and now vice president and the Bush administration's leading Iraq hawk, could have helped push the sanctions legislation but did not. "

http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/2002/.../coverstory.htm

Also, I have read (though I can't seem to locate this right now) that Powell caused problems in the First Gulf War, that when his superiors (Bush, I believe) gave him orders he carried them out well, but that his advice (which was disregarded) was based on bad conclusions he drew about the strength of the Iraqi army, and that if the war had been conducted his way it would have been alot longer and potentially more deadly. That was in a respectable publication too as I recall, (perhaps The New Republic? Can't find it).

[Occhidiangela]

I prefer 101 proof Wild Turkey bourbon whiskey. :)

As to the proof of 'breach,' it is already available to anyone who looks with due care on the past 12 years, and the evidence reported today that it was actually Scuds, which were supposed to be turned over, versus Frogs and other shorter range tactical ballistic missiles. The very fact of non cooperation was breach, for what it is worth. The last 12 years has been rife with that.

Scuds proven? Maybe. The methods used to detect and track Scud launches, which grew from ICBM detect and track methods, are pretty reliable. It may take a day or so for the analysts to look hard at the date, cull the false alarms from the valid info, some from sattelites, and trace the tracks back to their launching point. That sort of data would show if the missiles launched were beyond the shorter range missiles, and thus have to be Scud or other longer range missiles that were to be turned over ages ago . . .

On the other hand, if 'Scuds' were fired from within the range of the shorter range missiles, then some better analysis would be needed to compare speeds and other such telemtery to try and discriminate between missile types. It is doable, though I would venture to say not with 100% fidelity on every single launch, as the quality of each set of data might vary with sattelite timing and other such normal 'friction.'

In short, the news guys may have been a bit premature, as might the public affairs types feeding them, in announcing that it was actually Scuds that launched today and were felled by the Patriot missiles.

For Pete, just in the old FYI mode:

Patriot Pac II and Pac III were expressly developed with TBM defense in mind. The Army was not all that happy with how the Scuds actually performed, versus some of the stuff we may have been fed, nor were the various allies who were buying them. Pac II and Pac III competed with and displaced THAAD, (as well as the Navy SM-2 Block IVA and subsequent missiles) which was a noble attempt to build a TBM class weapon from the ground up that ran into both technical and budgetary problems. Last I heard, THAAD was dying a painful death on the cutting room floor of the BMDO: Balistic Missile Defense Office. I might be a bit out of date on that one, though.

Pac III was to have taken the old blast frag warhead and replaced it with a Hit To Kill / kinetic-kill style warhead. It was to harness the better processing power becoming available to achieve that tougher Pk spec. Perhaps this effort over the past decade or so has paid off.

[Naddybear]

I don't think what happened in Yugoslavia is analogous to Iraq. First of all, yes it was NATO and not the UN, but it was still a supra-national organization. I think there is significant difference between a group of nations deciding what to do on an ad hoc basis and going thru an organization like NATO, with its own established rules and procedures. I don't think anyone, not even the harshest critic of the administration, is saying you *have* to go through the UN. Had the US gone through NATO again this time, I think the criticism would be greatly muted. (Why NATO would be involved is a different matter, and probably would have required concrete linkage between 9/11 and Iraq-- which we could not show.)

Second, during the Yugoslav campaign, the people who wanted to intervene in the Balkans made the proper inquiries and found out Russia would veto any resolution authorizing the use of force in the Balkans. So Blair et al opted not to go through the UN at all. Perversely that had the effect of preserving the integrity of the UN; Yugoslavia became a NATO issue and the UN simply was not implicated, negatively or positively. Because again, no one is saying the UN is the be-all and end-all and sole arbiter of international relations. Regional organizations can, and have, acted without consultation with the UN in their own regional affairs. NATO is one example, and the OAS is another.

What the US did here, however, was quite different, not only for substantive reasons -- everyone agreed that Milosevic was committing genocide, the only issue was whether to act militarily; there is no such agreement on whether Iraq poses an immediate threat -- but also procedurally. And I think the process is what has angered Paris and Bonn more than the substance of this debate.

In other words, I don't think its simply a matter of risk analysis. Germany + France have lost far more troops in peace-keeping missions than the US. I think it is in part a principled objection to how the Bush Administration handled the whole debate. Quite frankly if I were President of France I don't see how I could have done it any differently than Chirac did, even if I truly believed Saddam is a threat.

[NuurAbSaal]

I agree on much of this. But I can't imagine being the President of France, so you're on your own there :P . I'm glad somebody besides me mentioned the differences between then and today, Occhi doesn't seem to want to comment on this :)

To Pete, amazingly this discussion really is still here, ultra-fast-paced as our times may be :lol:

down to bussiness:

Well, looking into the motives of these countries is difficult. However, I don't see what is sad about countries doing what is best for them. I think that that is what governments are supposed to do, look after the well being of the countries.

Ahem! How I would like this to be cynical (I hope it's not or I'm making a fool of myself).
You completely (intentioanally?) missed my point here. Best for these countries would be if they didn't have to fit into one of shrub's (I love this trem!) "with us or against us" categories, but could freely voice their opinion. However the US is putting SERIOUS pressure on them and so what's best for them now is to comply with the US government or face the consequences (like IIRC Yemen in 1991).

On the weapons issue, I first have to ask: Scuds cannot be used as carrier systems for B or C weapons, can they? I have heard both opinions and now am confused™.

It is IMO obvious that Iraq has violated the weapons restrictions put on him (her? it?? help plz). I have however strong doubts about Iraq possessing usable weapons of mass destruction. I'm sure Saddam would like some and would use them if he could (he has in the past, as we all know). There had to be done something about it and the UN inspectors seemed like a good idea to me. If their numbers had been increased as had been suggested before things turned out as they did I think this would either have prevented Iraq from ever putting together an ABC (or is it called NBC in English, as in nuclear, biological, chemical) warfare program or would have produced CLEAR evidence of Iraq already possessing one, which would likely have resulted in a new UN resolution legitimizing military action against Saddam.

But maybe I'm a naive optimist.

I guess we'll know in a couple of days about Saddam's arsenal, he'll use everything he has.

Nuur

[--Pete]

Hi,

How I would like this to be cynical

Nope. For a change I was being serious :)

Best for these countries would be if they didn't have to fit into one of shrub's (I love this trem!) "with us or against us" categories, but could freely voice their opinion.

To a large extent, the Shrub's opinion does not matter. The relationship between, say, Iceland and the United States would not change if Shrub thought they were "with us" or "against us". The reasons are many, but center around the fact that the president does not *set* foreign policy (although he does have some influence). Most foreign policy in the USA is set by the "hidden government" -- the power brokers who often are not even in office, stay on for life, and who represent special interest groups, mainly commercial.

In many ways, the situation in the USA is one where special interests groups try to run the country by means both fair (campaign contributions, lobbying) and foul (bribes, other illegal activities). The government, nominally the protector of the people in these cases, often sides with the special interests (see, for instance, the Microsoft "trials"). So, if it is in the financial interest of the hidden government to maintain good relationship with Iceland, then good relationships are maintained (see China, Taiwan, communism, Tienanmen square, Most Favored Nation).

While the population of the world mostly don't understand this (and that of the USA is very much included in the list of ignorant), be sure that the world leaders do. They know that the consequences of not supporting the USA in this endeavor will make little long term difference. Only open antagonism (a la Germany, France, Russia) will even be noticed. Thus, most nations can choose "not to choose" and there would be no reprisals. Thus, if they choose to support the USA, it must be for reasons beyond toadyism.

Scuds cannot be used as carrier systems for B or C weapons, can they?

Why not? A Scud is simply a rocket powered delivery system. I think this will answer your question: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gu...apons/scud.html

There had to be done something about it and the UN inspectors seemed like a good idea to me. If their numbers had been increased as had been suggested . . .

A nuclear weapons research program requires big facilities for the production of weapon's grade material. It could probably be discovered by inspectors with some help from the intelligence community. A chemical research program would be fairly small and easy to hide, but chemical weapons are bulky (many thousands, even millions of liters) and so that would be hard to hide. A biological research facility would only take up a few hundred square meters, small enough that it could easily be mounted on trailers and moved around the country. The quantities of biological weapons needed to make a significant impact are also small, of the order of a few hundred kilos. Again, easily hidden, easily transported.

While finding any of those capabilities would have proven that Iraq was building NBC capability (I still think of it as ABC from my military days of forty years ago :) ) not finding them proves nothing. And, since the capabilities *were* being developed a decade and more ago, not having any evidence (evidence that Saddam would have probably been only too happy to present had it existed) to show that that capability was destroyed (in accordance with the 1991 peace agreement) can only be taken as evidence that the research, development, and production of NBC capability in Iraq has continued since the '91 war.

More inspectors? "You can't sharpen a pencil with a blunt ax. Ten blunt axes are no better." Inspection and inspectors failed to disarm Iraq for seven years. How many years and how many ineffectual inspectors do you want to try this time before admitting that that "solution" does not work?

. . . which would likely have resulted in a new UN resolution legitimizing military action against Saddam.

Right. And who would have supplied the bulk of the military for this action? Hint, who has supplied the bulk of the military for all UN actions since the UN was established? So, delay the start of the war for a month of so. But the desert Summer conditions means that the delay would be then be for half a year. But in half a year, the USA will be in its election season. No way a president would want to start a war then (yeah, that is a piece of crap, but it is also the reality that must be worked with). So, no war until after the election, maybe until after the inauguration if there is a change of president.

That gives Iraq a year to develop a better biological agent, or to make more of it, or to buy some nukes from a "former Soviet republic". How many lives is it worth to go from 95% sure to 99% sure (and you'll never get 100% unless Saddam both makes those weapons and uses them in a first strike capability. Not even then if he uses a biological weapon in a deniable, covert, "terrorist" attack).

I guess we'll know in a couple of days about Saddam's arsenal, he'll use everything he has.

Maybe, maybe not. Maybe he'll destroy all traces that he ever even tried. He cannot win the war. He knows it. But if he survives and can claim that the invasion was unjust, that he was innocent of all charges, then he might very well "win the peace". Tome will tell.

--Pete