Essay Idea Post.

[Ajax]

Greetings all.

One of my research papers this term involves the European Union. Being geopolitically-minded, I figured I'd write it on security issues; I was also interested because it is generally understood that the EU/EC has had a history of just "declaring" their common defense or outsourcing it to third-party international organizations such as the WEU or NATO. But recent years have shown a significant development of EU security structure--namely, the Rapid Reaction Force under EU control and not necessarily a part of, or dependent on, NATO.

I'm thinking of writing about the quest for European autonomy from the US on strategic defense. As far as I understand it, the issue is defined by several characteristics:

1) US dominance of NATO as a result of the US military advantage in technology, experience, logistics, and funding,

2) EU desire to implement their own strategic plans and the implied need, to use NATO assets as component to their non-NATO, EU OPS,

3) Europe has been given large-scale security for "pennies on the dollar" (i.e. at a great savings) by US force overrepresentation in NATO,

4) the US desire, or need, for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of its security, evinced by

5) Europe's apparent unwillingness (apart from Turkey, Greece, the UK and maybe France) to spend the money necessary to achieve this. (I can't stress this enough; no matter what the outcome, Europe will have to spend more money on defense and it doesn't seem willing to do so.)

So, where do you all come in?

I'd like those interested to assemble these parameters into an understanding of the situation and/or prediction of the future arrangement in Europe or between Europe and the US. Now, don't think I'm being lazy, because I have already got a pretty good idea on my own paper topic (which I will post below.) But, I am hoping to take advantage of this forum's international membership to supply perspectives from the other side of the Atlantic. Or Pacific, if you happen to float that way. (American lurkers are also encouraged to reply, I'll listen to anyone's point of view!)

And finally, let it be known that if this thread is an irritation to the general public it shall be nuked, or at least quietly pass from the rolls due to lack of interest.

Many thanks,

[Ajax]

My tentative thesis:

Both sides of the Atlantic want increased capability by Europe, the budgets of Europe notwithstanding. On a realist, very simplified level, the Americans will not want to help guarantee the success of an operation with which they emphatically oppose; thus, NATO assets will ultimately be withheld for the majority of EU OPS. Case in point, the EU-led stabilization force to the Congo, which was done under the UN but without the logistical or C3 support from NATO it probably could have used. EU action independent of the US/NATO will have to be self-sustaining.

On the European side, the option of contributing (even under-capable and minimal forces) to an alliance which does not meet their strategic goals will be similarly unappealing. Thus, they have an incentive to back ot of NATO as well. However, to make up for the "capabilities gap" with the US, they have to spend even more than for simple force expansion (R&D costs, C3 establishment costs). Also, their program for EU security is more focused on "crisis-management" and "humanitarian missions" than for true-blue warmaking. All these factors will lead to a desire to continue the cooperative venture with America, albeit it probably will undergo drastic restructuring.

The Bush Administration (er. the current one) has been passively supportive of European endeavors. Under Clinton, Albright (SECSTATE) and Cohen (SECDEF) warned against straying too far from NATO, but the Bush Admin seems to realize that EU efforts will ultimately result in greater capabilities for Europe; and Europe and the US will likely be cooperative partners in any world order, r.e. the democratic peace theory.


Well, that's about it. Let me know what ya'll think.

Thanks.

[kandrathe]

Greetings all. 
...
So, where do you all come in? 
...
I'd like those interested to assemble these parameters into an understanding of the situation and/or prediction of the future arrangement in Europe or between Europe and the US. 
...
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European Union Defense Policy An American Perspective by Leslie S. Lebl

I think two issues are important to note: America will seek to promote NATO, where we have more say in what happens, and the EU will not be effective in establishing a NATO independant defense without commiting to the spending. In the end, if the EU has an effective defense force, the EU can derail or veto NATO efforts marginalizing the US role. But that is putting the cart before the horse, the more important question is; How will Europeans react to massive reductions in social programs to invest in military equipment and technology?

Another question I have is how cohesive an EU endeavor can be. If you look at the mixed success for anyone flying into a hot zone even with a humanitarian purpose. Humanitarian missions are especially politically dangerous as they are mostly down side risk. In a war, if the situation gets to hot you can apply force to cool things down, but in a humanitarian mission that is not an option. I'm concerned that the disparate political dialogues in Europe are antithetical to establishing a cohesive force with the hardihood to withstand the political backlash against the endeavor. If that is the case, then their operations will be doomed by the lack of political will in their respective countries, or worse act as a political lightning rod for radical opposition groups.

[Occhidiangela]

Greetings all.  One of my research papers this term involves the European Union.  Being geopolitically-minded, I figured I'd write it on security issues; I was also interested because it is generally understood that the EU/EC has had a history of just "declaring" their common defense or outsourcing it to third-party international organizations such as the WEU or NATO.  But recent years have shown a significant development of EU security structure--namely, the Rapid Reaction Force under EU control and not necessarily a part of, or dependent on, NATO. 

I'm thinking of writing about the quest for European autonomy from the US on strategic defense.  As far as I understand it, the issue is defined by several characteristics: 

1) US dominance of NATO as a result of the US military advantage in technology, experience, logistics, and funding,

2) EU desire to implement their own strategic plans and the implied need, to use NATO assets as component to their non-NATO, EU OPS,

3) Europe has been given large-scale security for "pennies on the dollar" (i.e. at a great savings) by US force overrepresentation in NATO,

4) the US desire, or need, for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of its security, evinced by

5) Europe's apparent unwillingness (apart from Turkey, Greece, the UK and maybe France) to spend the money necessary to achieve this.  (I can't stress this enough; no matter what the outcome, Europe will have to spend more money on defense and it doesn't seem willing to do so.) 

So, where do you all come in? 

I'd like those interested to assemble these parameters into an understanding of the situation and/or prediction of the future arrangement in Europe or between Europe and the US.  Now, don't think I'm being lazy, because I have already got a pretty good idea on my own paper topic (which I will post below.)  But, I am hoping to take advantage of this forum's international membership to supply perspectives from the other side of the Atlantic.  Or Pacific, if you happen to float that way.  (American lurkers are also encouraged to reply, I'll listen to anyone's point of view!) 

And finally, let it be known that if this thread is an irritation to the general public it shall be nuked, or at least quietly pass from the rolls due to lack of interest. 

Many thanks,
[right][snapback]58090[/snapback][/right]

NATO experience, personal, tells me the following.

Security operations, such as UNPROFOR 1991-1995, were abysmal failures due to failures in leadership, not for lack of skill or resources on the ground. The ability of the Serb factions to work between the seams kept that civil war going on longer than it need be, since the UN's leadership was, in a word, ineffective.

The EU has two problems to resolve if they want EFFECTIVE multilateral security organs that can operate outside of the NATO structure. I worked on a few mid 90's working groups that addressed some of these issues, many of which revolved around big backbone comms connectivity in the Southern Region.

1. Deciding when they (EU) don't want to operate with the only A team around. There will be times that such will appeal to the governments involved. The rest of the time, playing with the A team will enhance their security objectives and likelihood of successful action.

2. Paying for a capability that works, and investing in the training that makes the force effective when called upon. That ain't cheap, as mentioned above. The lack of will to spend the dough has been a problem in Europe since the early 1980's.

3. Leadership. The one significant shortcoming in European politics at present is lack of leadership. Too many chiefs, not enough Indians, though as bureaucrats and consensus builders, Europeans score many points. Trouble is, when you get to applying armed force to solve a problem, one requires decisiveness for success. That is in short supply. Absence of this element will doom any number of missions to failure. The professionalism and talent currently resident in the peacekeeping focused forces of Europe, about which I have nothing but good things to say, will not always translate into effective combat capability in more dire scenarios.

The ESDI (European Security Defenense Initiative, probably has a new name now) has always been predicated on: creible force, massivley modernized comms, and an increase in medium and heavy lift to wean European Security from the American nipple. The investment in lift is coming, comms perhaps, regionally dependent. Credible force is, at present, limited to UK, Dutch, and Turkish (and Aussie - non NATO-) forces.

The others have not been very effective at winning anything lately, or demonstrating winning qualities. A few successes will go a long way to restoring their credibility: credibility adds to the introduction of forces a deterrent element that lack thereof does not allow. Building that credibility will require risk, leadership, and decisiveness. I personally hope that it turns out that way, since I want to see our own % GDP for defense reduced in the long term.

My more recent experience with the ISAF involvement in Afghanistan says . . . lack of decisiveness and inability to take risks in the field, without inane deliberation, is still a critical liability, and an obstacle to success. Timeliness is a key element to decision making in tactical environments.

I aint holding my breath, and hope that Europe will grow a sack before it becomes demographically Muslim.

Occhi

[Ajax]

European Union Defense Policy An American Perspective by Leslie S. Lebl

I think two issues are important to note:  America will seek to promote NATO, where we have more say in what happens, and the EU will not be effective in establishing a NATO independant defense without commiting to the spending.  In the end, if the EU has an effective defense force, the EU can derail or veto NATO efforts marginalizing the US role.  But that is putting the cart before the horse, the more important question is;  How will Europeans react to massive reductions in social programs to invest in military equipment and technology?

Another question I have is how cohesive an EU endeavor can be.  If you look at the mixed success for anyone flying into a hot zone even with a humanitarian purpose.  Humanitarian missions are especially politically dangerous as they are mostly down side risk.  In a war, if the situation gets to hot you can apply force to cool things down, but in a humanitarian mission that is not an option.  I'm concerned that the disparate political dialogues in Europe are antithetical to establishing a cohesive force with the hardihood to withstand the political backlash against the endeavor.  If that is the case, then their operations will be doomed by the lack of political will in their respective countries, or worse act as a political lightning rod for radical opposition groups.
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kandrathe--

I appreciate the link. :-)

It is quite interesting you bring up the cut in European social programs resulting from an increase in military spending. After I posted, I found an article which pointed out demographic shifts--the Baby Boomers are aging, putting them into the "dependent" status of the European states at the time when these states are supposed to be entering into true autonomous security. Riiiight.

This makes even more difficult the problem of fundign their security apparatus.

Your point on decisiveness of command is also spot-on. There is something of a spat, with Turkey trying to enter the EU and Cyprus (despite pledges to the contrary) is moving to antagonize the proceedings or block them entirely. Now imagine these military forces, side-by-side, with their leadership personnel incorporated into the same structure! That'd be a sight...

Thanks for the reply.

[kandrathe]

kandrathe--

I appreciate the link.  :-)

It is quite interesting you bring up the cut in European social programs resulting from an increase in military spending.  After I posted, I found an article which pointed out demographic shifts--the Baby Boomers are aging, putting them into the "dependent" status of the European states at the time when these states are supposed to be entering into true autonomous security.  Riiiight.

This makes even more difficult the problem of fundign their security apparatus. 
...
Thanks for the reply.
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I found this older comparison of various nations defense spending as a percentage of GDP. It is still interesting to note the trend.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_con...9/tableE-5.html

[Ajax]

Occhi, thankfully, you were quick to respond to this. I was hoping for your input in particular. :-)

Security operations, such as UNPROFOR 1991-1995, were abysmal failures due to failures in leadership, not for lack of skill or resources on the ground.

While I would agree that NATO provides a much more solid structure to solving regional problems, there are others out there who would not. Frédéric Bozo has written an article titled The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling, in which he argues that in Kosovo "…the Alliance [i.e. NATO] only succeeded in that it did not fail." He goes on to argue that European structures could be more capable than the NATO ones. Of course, to me this sounds like he wants to have his cake and eat it too--his understanding of the relationship is that Europeans will have their own autonomous security doctrine, but still have access to NATO assets (hence, the "Danger of Decoupling").

The EU has two problems to resolve if they want EFFECTIVE multilateral security organs that can operate outside of the NATO structure. I worked on a few mid 90's working groups that addressed some of these issues, many of which revolved around big backbone comms connectivity in the Southern Region.

Interesting. I'd like to talk off-line (er... off-thread as it were) about this experience. But the communications issue is the perfect example of the capabilities gap in general. The US forces have actually retained outdated commo gear solely for operations with the allies. As this gear ages, and the Europeans do not upgrade, it is likely to put the US military in an intersting situation. Retain archaic gear, or get rid of it and not communicate with the allied nations? Additionally, issues of information security and technology transfer pop up. Do we transmit sensitive data over more vulnerable systems, or simply not communicate very well with the allied component? SIPRNET comes to mind... A thorny issue.

1. Deciding when they (EU) don't want to operate with the only A team around. There will be times that such will appeal to the governments involved. The rest of the time, playing with the A team will enhance their security objectives and likelihood of successful action.

Again, a sensitive issue. According to this article, the EU has already engaged in OPS outside of Europe without the support of NATO. So if you have a worldwide scope of humanitarian involvement, no logistical capabilities and rudimentary C3, what happens? You either curtail your ops or your develop logistic and c3 capability. Only the European finances don't look like that'll happen.

Which brings us to...

2. Paying for a capability that works, and investing in the training that makes the force effective when called upon. That ain't cheap, as mentioned above. The lack of will to spend the dough has been a problem in Europe since the early 1980's.

kandrathe's new link is moderatly useful, but I doubt it would apply for the post 9/11 world, or to this new round of European security development. I'm trying to find some more current figures. That being said, it doesn't seem that there has been any significant change, apart from maybe Britain.

3. Leadership. The one significant shortcoming in European politics at present is lack of leadership. Too many chiefs, not enough Indians, though as bureaucrats and consensus builders, Europeans score many points. Trouble is, when you get to applying armed force to solve a problem, one requires decisiveness for success. That is in short supply. Absence of this element will doom any number of missions to failure. The professionalism and talent currently resident in the peacekeeping focused forces of Europe, about which I have nothing but good things to say, will not always translate into effective combat capability in more dire scenarios.

As kandrathe pointed out, the ability to build consensus and administer a bureaucracy has a limited use in military operations. I would point out that these skills are a bit more useful in the RRF's avowed roles of "crisis management" and "humanitarian intervention" but as the situation gets closer and closer to actual, true-blue warmaking these skills tend to fall out of favor relative to "decisiveness."

And this begs the overall issue: Europe still seems to want a free ride to global security through US military power. The EU member states don't want to spend the money to help in a profound way (although France has a significant capability advantage over most of the states, and Britain is increasing its funding), but they want to be able to determine strategic plans. The words "free" and "riders" seem to pop into my head, as if out of the blue!

Some other things which come to mind are force structure. Are Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) practicable for NATO or the EU? How about HQ structures? Should the EU develop its own HQ or should it rely on FR and UK structures already in place (and the GER one under development)? How does this impact the duplication and competition issues with NATO?

Thanks for your post.

[Ajax]

I found this older comparison of various nations defense spending as a percentage of GDP.  It is still interesting to note the trend.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_con...9/tableE-5.html
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I found newer figures, a chart at the end shows the trend over the last few years.
clicky here.

[kandrathe]

I found newer figures, a chart at the end shows the trend over the last few years. 
clicky here.
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Awesome. I'll save that link. There are some areas that I can't see EU catching up on for decades, even if they committed themselves now, like fighter aircraft, navy, and heavy lift. Even the majority of EU troop strength seems to be deficient by half. Tables D-4 and D-5 tell the story in that EU defense spending is on the decline, when measured in real dollars, or as a percentage of GDP.

[Occhidiangela]

Occhi, thankfully, you were quick to respond to this.  I was hoping for your input in particular.  :-)
While I would agree that NATO provides a much more solid structure to solving regional problems, there are others out there who would not.

Frédéric Bozo has written an article titled [i]The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling, in which he argues that in Kosovo "…the Alliance [i.e. NATO] only succeeded in that it did not fail."  He goes on to argue that European structures could be more capable than the NATO ones.  [/I]

He is well named, that Mr Bozo.  Floppy black shoes and all.  His position is utter crap, that last line . . . until Europe gets serious about spending on credible capability.  However, Kosovo was only successful, if it can be called that, due to US capability.  Look at the sortie count.

I personally consider Kosovo a ludicrous policy decision: typical French/Euro Security attempt, when you put 19 nations against one nation of small economic and military power, already weakened by 8 years of civil war.  Risk?  Minimal.  Impact?  To further the Muslim agenda on mainland Europe, a follow up to the Muslim agenda cloaked in "they are the underdog" in Bosnia.  I saw it then, and I cannot believe more people don't see it now.  They use their economic leverage, oil, to try and influence their long term goals.  Just as any emerging power base does.

The "bully" precedent that so many liberals abuse Pres Bush for was Kosovo.  Thanks, Dems, for that.  Oh yeah, our folks did blow a lot of stuff up, we are damned good at that.  The rubble even bounced.

WJ Clinton let Chirac talk him into attacking a nation who was already on thin ice.  What a shame.

Of course, to me this sounds like he wants to have his cake and eat it too--his understanding of the relationship is that Europeans will have their own autonomous security doctrine, but still have access to NATO assets (hence, the "Danger of Decoupling"). 
Interesting. 

Having seen it close up, it is all hot air.  You hit the nail on the head "want cake and eat it too."  That said, in many, but NOT ALL, situations, US and Europe do indeed have parallel and complementary security interests, and it makes sense to continue to work together.  Let's not break up a pretty good team over differences, let's work through them so that the next time we get it righter, together.  Play is continuous.

I'd like to talk off-line (er... off-thread as it were) about this experience.  But the communications issue is the perfect example of the capabilities gap in general.  The US forces have actually retained outdated commo gear solely for operations with the allies.  As this gear ages, and the Europeans do not upgrade, it is likely to put the US military in an intersting situation.  Retain archaic gear, or get rid of it and not communicate with the allied nations?  Additionally, issues of information security and technology transfer pop up.  Do we transmit sensitive data over more vulnerable systems, or simply not communicate very well with the allied component?  SIPRNET comes to mind... A thorny issue. 

SIPRNET is still a thorny issue, as of the day I left Qatar.  I better leave it at that.

Again, a sensitive issue.  According to this article, the EU has already engaged in OPS outside of Europe without the support of NATO. 

So what?  They started Sharp Fence before we combined WEU and NATO Ops into Sharp Guard.  (I was involved in that) 

As kandrathe pointed out, the ability to build consensus and administer a bureaucracy has a limited use in military operations.

Yes and no.  War is a political act, and many security operations "short of war" take on the same flavor.  Ike found out that his hardest job was keeping the consensus focused, pol mil, and that was in a pretty focused effort, much simpler than the multilateral challenges of today.

I would point out that these skills are a bit more useful in the RRF's avowed roles of "crisis management" and "humanitarian intervention" but as the situation gets closer and closer to actual, true-blue warmaking these skills tend to fall out of favor relative to "decisiveness."

The RRF aint rapid.  See lift.

And this begs the overall issue:  Europe still seems to want a free ride to global security through US military power.  The EU member states don't want to spend the money to help in a profound way (although France has a significant capability advantage over most of the states, and Britain is increasing its funding), but they want to be able to determine strategic plans.  The words "free" and "riders" seem to pop into my head, as if out of the blue!

Some other things which come to mind are force structure.  Are Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) practicable for NATO [i]or the EU?  How about HQ structures?  Should the EU develop its own HQ or should it rely on FR and UK structures already in place (and the GER one under development)?  How does this impact the duplication and competition issues with NATO?[/I]

I just came out of the CJTF environment.  CJTF-7 was OK, MNCI barely utile, MNFI frought with security leaks that is getting Iraqi National Guardsmen killed.  See recent news on the ambush of buse full of them.  Obviously an inside job, from what I read in the Open Source reports.

However, if you must from a political angle fight as a coalition, which is American policy, then you have to use the CJTF tool.  That is what, for all its warts, it is built for.

Thanks for your post.
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Thanks for bringing up recent painful memories. :P

Occhi