03-22-2003, 06:47 AM
Hello, I have some thoughts in response to your post.
1. What are the risks of taking down Saddam? From the American perspective, I see none.
The U.S. has already been the target of spectacular terrorist attacks, and no doubt more would be on the way if the U.S. did nothing.
Saddam's continued existence was a risk to America too great to ignore. Please consider, Saddam no longer needed to be able to build his own nuclear weapons, he could just save a year or two revenues from smuggled oil to buy prefabricated nukular warheads from the North Koreans. Saddam had motive, means, and inevitably an opportunity in the future.
What are the European perceptions of risk?
2. About the odd collections of nations pro/con: I've read that one way to break it down is present and former naval powers (US, UK, Spain, Japan) versus present and former land powers (France, Germany, Russia, China). Being a naval power changes your cultuaral approach to foreign policy, according to this analysis. Naval powers are accustomed to gunboat diplomacy, land powers are either at total war or they are not. This analysis is compatible with the risk avoidance theory you put forward in the first post.
3. I do not understand what risk is perceived by save-Saddam crowd. ~They~ are not doing the fighting, and seem willing to believe protestations by Saddam that he has no WMD, so what risk is perceived from their quarter? I personally get stuck here, and conclude that it is the money trail that counts most.
4. Weak nation diplomacy is to self-righteously protest when a strong nation uses means to achieve its ends which a weak nation cannot match. Early American foreign policy (1792-18XX) with regard to European affairs was quite moralistic, and very affordable. (Except we should have learned even then that boycotts and sanctions are not very practical). The nations against us are all weak, but so are some of those allied with us. The explanatory power of this 'weakness' hypothesis is unclear to me.
5. I am an ideologue and not a cynic because I believe in the power of ideas. One particular idea that I believe is a powerful motivator and analytical tool is the perception of an ideological common thread among the peaceniks is called 'Transnational Progressivism'. This is the new refuge of communists and socialists now that the imperial communism of the Soviet Union no longer has any glamour. John Fonte, "The Ideaological War within the West"
Growler
"These are not books, lumps of lifeless paper, but minds alive on the shelves." -- Gilbert Highet (from my amazon.com bookmarker)
1. What are the risks of taking down Saddam? From the American perspective, I see none.
The U.S. has already been the target of spectacular terrorist attacks, and no doubt more would be on the way if the U.S. did nothing.
Saddam's continued existence was a risk to America too great to ignore. Please consider, Saddam no longer needed to be able to build his own nuclear weapons, he could just save a year or two revenues from smuggled oil to buy prefabricated nukular warheads from the North Koreans. Saddam had motive, means, and inevitably an opportunity in the future.
What are the European perceptions of risk?
2. About the odd collections of nations pro/con: I've read that one way to break it down is present and former naval powers (US, UK, Spain, Japan) versus present and former land powers (France, Germany, Russia, China). Being a naval power changes your cultuaral approach to foreign policy, according to this analysis. Naval powers are accustomed to gunboat diplomacy, land powers are either at total war or they are not. This analysis is compatible with the risk avoidance theory you put forward in the first post.
3. I do not understand what risk is perceived by save-Saddam crowd. ~They~ are not doing the fighting, and seem willing to believe protestations by Saddam that he has no WMD, so what risk is perceived from their quarter? I personally get stuck here, and conclude that it is the money trail that counts most.
4. Weak nation diplomacy is to self-righteously protest when a strong nation uses means to achieve its ends which a weak nation cannot match. Early American foreign policy (1792-18XX) with regard to European affairs was quite moralistic, and very affordable. (Except we should have learned even then that boycotts and sanctions are not very practical). The nations against us are all weak, but so are some of those allied with us. The explanatory power of this 'weakness' hypothesis is unclear to me.
5. I am an ideologue and not a cynic because I believe in the power of ideas. One particular idea that I believe is a powerful motivator and analytical tool is the perception of an ideological common thread among the peaceniks is called 'Transnational Progressivism'. This is the new refuge of communists and socialists now that the imperial communism of the Soviet Union no longer has any glamour. John Fonte, "The Ideaological War within the West"
Growler
"These are not books, lumps of lifeless paper, but minds alive on the shelves." -- Gilbert Highet (from my amazon.com bookmarker)
Growler
"To excuse such an atrocity by blaming U.S. government policies is to deny the basic idea of all morality: that individuals are responsible for their actions." -- Salman Rushdie writing of September 11th
"To excuse such an atrocity by blaming U.S. government policies is to deny the basic idea of all morality: that individuals are responsible for their actions." -- Salman Rushdie writing of September 11th