Did Bush manipulate Iraq data?

[Growler]

First some perspective on why this is important: Iraq had a viable bomb design and capability to build it but lacked only the fissile material. (Senate testimony , House testimony) There was no margin of error for making 'most probable use' judgement calls about questionable materials, they had to be prevented from making their own bomb grade uranium at all costs.

High tensile strength aluminum tubes are on the General Restricted List of items only because of their potential use in constructing gas centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium. The suitability for use in a centrifuge of the particular tubes Iraq tried to acquire is most thoroughly evaluated by David Albright here: The CIA's Aluminum Tubes' Assessment: Is the Nuclear Case Going Down the Tubes? by David Albright. and here: Aluminum Tubing Is an Indicator of an Iraqi Gas Centrifuge Program: But Is the Tubing Specifically for Centrifuges?

The first Albright link has a helpful table at the end comparing the characteristics of the tubes in question and their suitability for use as centrifuge components or missile tubes. Clearly, they seem better suited for missile tubes but Albright's own evaluation has all of the properties compatible with use in a centrifuge as well, with the exception of the anodization. One point he makes is this:

An inevitable conclusion is that the CIA analysis tried to design a centrifuge around the tubes rather than determine the use of the tubes from their characteristics.

But if I were an Iraqi engineer working on a clandestine nuke program that is exactly what I would do, design a centrifuge that would work with materials that are less suspicious and more readily available. Anodization may be unnecessary, but given Iraq's difficulties in concealing the program the tubes could well be stored for years before being used, or spend much time in transport, and the consequent oxidation of the surface of the tubes would ruin them. The design of a centrifuge using these tubes would probably be inefficient, but Mr. Albright has this to say in his other piece on the tubes:

If Iraq used a supply of low enriched uranium that it acquired illicitly or diverted from a safeguarded stock in Iraq at the Tuwaitha nuclear site, it would need far fewer centrifuges or it could make a given amount of weapon-grade uranium significantly faster.

...with the corollary also that inefficient centrifuge designs become more practical if the input material is already partially enriched.

Mr. Albright's conclusion that the tubes were probably missile tubes is purely based on narrow technical grounds and fails to take into account engineering ingenuity evidenced by Iraqis previously in even having a nuclear program to begin with, nor Saddam's political will to retain the program at all costs. The aluminum tubes cannot be ruled out as centrifuge components and it would be irresponsible to proceed as if they could be so ruled out. 'Probably' is not good enough, and so they must be regarded as centrifuge components.

If you wish to continue playing this game, please provide links in the future and try to refrain from quoting LA Times opinion pieces as if they were anything but propaganda themselves.