"Bush campaign ads using team"

[kandrathe]

That would include me and the 9/11 Commission.

Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda—save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against “Crusaders” during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army. (53)
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


To protect his own ties with Iraq,Turabi [the leader of Sudan] reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad’s control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin’s help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam.There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.(54)
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq respondedto this request.(55) As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


Though Bin Ladin had promised Taliban leaders that he would be circumspect, he broke this promise almost immediately, giving an inflammatory interview to CNN in March 1997. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar promptly “invited” Bin Ladin to move to Kandahar, ostensibly in the interests of Bin Ladin’s own security but more likely to situate him where he might be easier to control.(73)
There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response.According to one report, Saddam Hussein’s efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin.(74) In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin’s public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with he Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin’s Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December.(75)
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides’ hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States.(76)
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations. The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah.The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had “reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.”(109)
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


In February 1999,Allen proposed flying a U-2 mission over Afghanistan to build a baseline of intelligence outside the areas where the tribals had coverage. Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible.He wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin’s having met with Iraqi officials, who “may have offered him asylum.” Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein’s service, and it would be “virtually impossible” to find him.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


Atta’s Alleged Trip to Prague
Mohamed Atta is known to have been in Prague on two occasions: in December 1994, when he stayed one night at a transit hotel, and in June 2000, when he was en route to the United States. On the latter occasion, he arrived by bus from Germany, on June 2, and departed for Newark the following day.(69)
The allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001 originates from the reporting of a single source of the Czech intelligence service. Shortly after 9/11, the source reported having seen Atta meet with Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, an Iraqi diplomat, at the Iraqi Embassy in Prague on April 9, 2001, at 11:00 A.M. This information was passed to CIA headquarters.
The U.S. legal attaché (“Legat”) in Prague, the representative of the FBI, met with the Czech service’s source. After the meeting, the assessment of the Legat and the Czech officers present was that they were 70 percent sure that the source was sincere and believed his own story of the meeting. Subsequently, the Czech intelligence service publicly stated that there was a 70 percent probability that the meeting between Atta and Ani had taken place.The Czech Interior Minister also made several statements to the press about his belief that the meeting had occurred, and the story was widely reported.
The FBI has gathered evidence indicating that Atta was in Virginia Beach on April 4 (as evidenced by a bank surveillance camera photo), and in Coral Springs, Florida on April 11, where he and Shehhi leased an apartment.On April 6, 9, 10, and 11,Atta’s cellular telephone was used numerous times to call various lodging establishments in Florida from cell sites within Florida.We cannot confirm that he placed those calls. But there are no U.S. records indicating that Atta departed the country during this period. Czech officials have reviewed their flight and border records as well for any indication that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001, including records of anyone crossing the border who even looked Arab.They have also reviewed pictures from the area near the Iraqi embassy and have not discovered photos of anyone who looked like Atta. No evidence has been found that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001. According to the Czech government,Ani, the Iraqi officer alleged to have met with Atta,was about 70 miles away from Prague on April 8–9 and did not return until the afternoon of the ninth, while the source was firm that the sighting occurred at 11:00 A.M.When questioned about the reported April 2001 meeting,Ani—now in custody—has denied ever meeting or having any contact with Atta.Ani says that shortly after 9/11, he became concerned that press stories about the alleged meeting might hurt his career. Hoping to clear his name, Ani asked his superiors to approach the Czech government about refuting the allegation. He also denies knowing of any other Iraqi official having contact with Atta. These findings cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Atta was in Prague on April 9, 2001. He could have used an alias to travel and a passport under that alias, but this would be an exception to his practice of using his true name while traveling (as he did in January and would in July when he took his next overseas trip). The FBI and CIA have uncovered no evidence that Atta held any fraudulent passports. KSM and Binalshibh both deny that an Atta-Ani meeting occurred. There was no reason for such a meeting, especially considering the risk it would pose to the operation. By April 2001, all four pilots had completed most of their training,and the muscle hijackers were about to begin entering the United States.
The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting.(70)
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


Recommendation:The President and the Congress deserve praise for their efforts in Afghanistan so far. Now the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. The United States and the international community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


[Glossary of Names]
Mamdouh Mahmud (a.k.a.Abu Hajer al Iraqi) Iraqi; chief procurement Salim officer for al Qaeda in Sudan; arrested in connection with 1998 embassy bombings
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


[footnote]
55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee,May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004). Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq’s intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received “third hand,” passed from the foreign government service that “does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information
from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the
Service.”The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin’s Sudan farm in December 1995.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


[footnote]
74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report, Saddam Hussein’s efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


[footnote]
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


[footnote]
76. CIA analytic report,“Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa’ida’s Ally in Northeastern Iraq,” CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1,
2003. See also DIA analytic report,“Special Analysis: Iraq’s Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida,” July 31, 2002; CIA analytic
report,“Old School Ties,” Mar. 10, 2003.We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 contacts.
They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although
there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives
training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of
his original information.Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative,Feb. 14,2004.Two senior Bin Ladin
associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations
of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum,“Requested
Modifications to ‘Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq–al Qaida Contacts (1990–2003),’” Dec. 10,
2003, p. 5).
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


[footnote]
49. CIA cable,“Efforts to Locate al-Midhar,” Jan. 13, 2000.We now know that two other al Qaeda operatives
flew to Bangkok to meet Khallad to pass him money. See chapter 8.That was not known at the time. Mihdhar was
met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant
colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen have turned out to be incorrect.They were based on a confusion of Shakir’s identity
with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar name,who was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same
time Shakir was in police custody in Qatar. See CIA briefing by CTC specialists (June 22, 2004);Walter Pincus and
Dan Eggen,“Al Qaeda Link to Iraq May Be Confusion over Names,”Washington Post, June 22, 2004, p.A13.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04


[footnote]
69. Reports that Atta was in the Prague airport on May 30–31, 2000, and that he was turned back because
he lacked a visa appear to be a case of mistaken identity: a Pakistani traveler with a name similar to Atta’s attempted to enter the Czech Republic from Saudi Arabia via Germany but was forced to return to Germany because he lacked a valid Czech visa. CIA cable, report re traveler to Prague, Dec. 8, 2001.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04

[footnote]
70. For Czech source reporting and credibility assessment, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Eliska T. interview (May 20, 2004). For the information being reported to CIA, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). For the leak and the ministers’ statements, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). On April 4, 2001, Atta cashed an $8,000 check at a bank in Virginia Beach; he appears on a bank surveillance tape. For FBI evidence of Atta being in Virginia Beach, see FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing 265ANY- 280350-302-615, 688, 896, 898). For FBI evidence of Atta being in Coral Springs, see ibid. (Apr. 11, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 3817, 5214). For Czech government finding no evidence of Atta’s presence and having evidence that Ani was not in Prague, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004).Aside from scrutinizing various official records, the Czech government also reviewed surveillance photos taken outside the Iraqi embassy. CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). None of the people photographed that day resembled Atta, although the surveillance only operated from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. CIA cable, review of surveillance photos, Feb. 27, 2002. For Ani’s denials of any meetings and request to superiors, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, Oct. 1, 2003. For KSM’s denial of the meeting, see Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Binalshibh has stated that Atta and he were so close that Atta probably would have told him of a meeting with an Iraqi official. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002. Binalshibh also stated that Bin Ladin was upset with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for committing atrocities against Iraqi Muslims, and that Bin Ladin would never have approved such a meeting. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 4, 2002. For Atta not using an alias during his July 2001 trip, see FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 14, 2002.
-911 Commission Final Report 7/22/04

[Thecla]

Extracting and condensing what seem to me to be the most relevant parts of your quote, I get this:

In 2001, with Bin Ladin’s help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.

Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request.

There is also evidence that around this time [March 1997] Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response.

In March 1998, after Bin Ladin’s public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with he Taliban and then with Bin Ladin.

Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides’ hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States.

On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations. The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had “reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.”

A rather small number of meetings that appear to have led nowhere, a possible offer of safe haven that Bin Laden declined, Iraq's support of a terrorist group opposed to the Kurds in territory it did not even control, and a claim in a US indictment -- not apparently backed up by any other intelligence -- of a cooperative understanding that included weapons development.

Extraordinarily flimsy evidence for Iraq's supposed "support of Al Qaeda", like everything else (except for the brutality of Hussein's regime) used to justify this dishonest, reckless, and disasterous war.

[D-Dave]

Time ago a research in Germany  (a country where I'm not from :D ) showed, that 25 % of the germans thought Bush had soemthing to do with the 9/11 attacks. And that was pre Michael Moore's fahrenheit911.

Just a little correction there (we germans are not that much into conspiracy).

The poll you refer to was conducted by a german Newspaper and it was the result of a Report on the Security Briefing George W. Bush received on August 6th, 2001 titeled "Bin Laden determined to attack inside the USA" an detailing that he was planning to attack America by hijacking Planes. Most importantly it did not have 25% stating that Bush "had something to do with the 9/11 attack" but that he was at least partialy to blame for it as he did not respond to that report as he should have done.

ah and @kandrathe:
as you just love to quote from that odd piece of writing (aka Final Report of the 9/11 Commission), I would like to provide you with two more dates that strangely did not make their way into the report:

1997 Taliban officials meet with Unocal and Halleburton (at that time headed by our one and only Dick Cheney) Executives in ... dada ... Texas (at this time governed by good old Goerge W.)
not too interesting that is, but this one is better:

March 19th, 2001 Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi (a Taliban Minister) is invited to the State Department to improve relations

Now according to you logic (and that briliant one of the authors of the 9/11 Report) would you belive the US govenment was "connected to" or "supporting" the taliban regime...of course not US Industry and Government are the good guys...
You see my point is that despite the haze of "I have no recollection of that" and mist of "we could not prove" that enshrouds the Report you still state it's findings as ultimate facts, while they to some extend are not only vague but at least borderlineish wrong (see our last little discussion for a couple of examples)
But I guess there is no point argueing with you about that Report as you seem to know it by heart and one who spends the time to memorize a piece of writing like that will not likely accept any critics on it.

Anyway, it seems to me this is another time for me to resume my Cassandra (greek mythology) Role as I did way back before the War started in the first place (here):

What do I think will happen if the Bush administration wins the Election?
In Iraq people will not receive the means to be able to rebuild the country by themselves (and in the process of doing so gaining enough self confidence to withstand extremists...we Germans learned that lesson well; Marshall Plan anyone?) but instead heavy weight Multi-Million-Dollar Companys (mostly those who funded Bush's Campaign) will do the rebuilding (and in the process draining mucho Money out of the country)just as it at the moment. End Result: Iraq will be a paradise for Terrorist Recruiters to fill their ranks.

In the US the richer will get richer, the poorer will get poorer. More "outsourcing" of already healthy companys to maximize profits. Further isolation from the international Community (I don't think the "either with us or with the terrorists" attitude is a thing that any sovereign country [maybe apart from the UK] is likely to accept). The education will suffer from the cuts in funding reducing the education of the average people. The Health system will grow even worse (how high is the percentage of people in the US that do not have Health Insurance already?).

Call me a sceptic but the current admistration has not shown any sign of not acting like stated above...
[end Cassandra Mode]

Well, enough for now, have to stop to get a fright out of the Republicans' Convention.. :ph34r:
Greetings Dave

Edit:
Had to add my first real big scare: Arnold stating something about the UN not knowing what democracy is and the whole crowd started cheering USA, USA... man so much for my fear of further isolation under Bush.

[kandrathe]

as you just love to quote from that odd piece of writing (aka Final Report of the 9/11 Commission), I would like to provide you with two more dates that strangely did not make their way into the report:

They at least spent a few hundred thousand man hours investigating the facts as they could get them. You feel free to consider the relationship between Iraq and Bin Laden as coincidental, and inconsequential. Perhaps Osama was just soliciting the Iraqi's for building contracts for his construction firms, or maybe shipping oil on his shipping fleet. Wars and desparation make for strange bedfellows indeed.

But, just to get your urban legends correct;

1997 Taliban officials meet with Unocal and Halleburton (at that time headed by our one and only Dick Cheney) Executives in ... dada ... Texas (at this time governed by good old Goerge W.)

Hmmm, that was arranged by if anyone, the Clinton administration (probably Richard Clarke) and involved UNOCAL, and not Haliburton.

BBC - Taleban in Texas for talks on gas pipeline
Telegraph - Oil barons court Taliban in Texas
Controversial new movie repeats old and false allegations about Unocal
Newsweek: More Distortions From Michael Moore - Some of the main points in ‘Fahrenheit 9/11’ really aren’t very fair at all - June 30, 2004

March 19th, 2001 Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi (a Taliban Minister) is invited to the State Department to improve relations

ABCNEWS - Defending the Taliban, The Taliban's 24-Year-Old PR Man 3/23/2001

And by the way, the UN is in New York. Diplomats of all flavors come here. We even had Soviets here at the height of the Cold War.

Please stop getting your facts from Micheal Moore's propaganda;

Here is a different wrinkle to add to your conspiracy theories;
Bin Laden, The Hidden Truth, Chapter 1 -- by Guillaume Dasquié and Jean-Charles Brisard November, 2001

[kandrathe]

Extraordinarily flimsy evidence for Iraq's supposed "support of Al Qaeda", like everything else (except for the brutality of Hussein's regime) used to justify this dishonest, reckless, and disasterous war.

First, I don't think you or I get to see all the intel, and there was bound to be some HUMINT sources that might have been compromised if their testimony had been revealed in the 9/11 commission report. We are not talking about justification for a war, only whether or not a relationship existed between OBL and senior Iraqi officials.

The potential threat of Bin Laden gaining new state sponsorship with Iraq was just one point of the triangle. The others being, the potential for distributing WMD's via a terror network and the third was the failure of UN sanctions and weapons inspections from keeping Iraq from generating cash to rebuild its war machine. The humanitarian concerns make for good PR, but if we are not willing to save millions in central Africa, I doubt we would start a war in the middle east for just humanitarian reasons.

[Thecla]

First, I don't think you or I get to see all the intel, and there was bound to be some HUMINT sources that might have been compromised if their testimony had been revealed in the 9/11 commission report.

You're the one that quoted the 9/11 report in evidence, not me; but one fall out of the Iraq debacle is that the US government has lost any credibility it may have had (inside or outside the US) to claim "trust us -- we have intel that shows this is true but we can't reveal the sources without compromising them." As far as Iraq/Al Qaeda goes, the connections were implausible to begin with -- no doubt Bin Laden is as happy as anyone about Hussein's downfall.

We are not talking about justification for a war, only whether or not a relationship existed between OBL and senior Iraqi officials.

Actually, we are talking about justification for war -- that's what the supposed Iraq/Al Qaeda connections were. This isn't an abstract debate. And the post-war debate is full of weasel terms like "relationship" which mean nothing at all.

The potential threat of Bin Laden gaining new state sponsorship with Iraq was just one point of the triangle. The others being, the potential for distributing WMD's via a terror network and the third was the failure of UN sanctions and weapons inspections from keeping Iraq from generating cash to rebuild its war machine.

A lot of "potential" threats there. Nonexistent Bin Laden sponsorship by Iraq, nonexistent WMDs, and nonexistent reconstruction of Iraq's war machine (though plenty of new palaces for Sadam Hussein).

The humanitarian concerns make for good PR, but if we are not willing to save millions in central Africa, I doubt we would start a war in the middle east for just humanitarian reasons.

Here, at least we do agree.

[eppie]

Holland is a geographicly small country, and for this reason you don't get a lot of different thinking people

That is very untrue. We have here something like 25 political parties of which there are on average at least 10 in the parlement. To compare the democratic and republican party of the US would be both in one of our parties which has more or less 15 % of the seats at the moment (it is right from the middle) (for simplicity)
People call america a melting pot of cultures, well that might be true for california, but say Nebraska, hardly. To see a melting pot, try visiting holland once (I will be happy to host you :D ).

No to say we don't have a lot of different people is very untrue. Of course we are doing generally very well (wealth and economy wise) so there is not so much extremism (both left or right, as well as religious) but the country is very divided in opinions.

That is also why I can trust what I see and read in the media. You have here everything, owned by all kinds of people or organsiations. Our public television (and I think that is almost unique) consists of around 10 different stations with different social and religious backgrounds. Of course we also have commercial stations, but very few of them have news programs (because they are not entertaining enough and nobody tales them serious). One of them has though and you clearly see the difference. There are more "cat in tree" stories, and less serious news.

About you accusation of nationalism. That almost doesn't exist here (has to do with the size of the country). Nationalism is almost a dirty word here. I' m happy though that I grew up in a country like this.

[Jester]

"Just because you agree with the propoganda does not make it something else."

Might I add the obvious corollary?

Just because you disagree with it doesn't make it propaganda.

"Holland is a geographicly small country, and for this reason you don't get a lot of different thinking people."

And New York City is, geographically speaking, much smaller than Holland. Does that mean there is proportionally less diversity of opinion? Or even less at all? I don't think that argument makes any sense.

Jester

[kandrathe]

If you are waiting for the video showing OBL and Saddam discussing how to best use Iraq's WMD stockpile on terror campaigns then you are right -- this evidence and intelligence is flimsy. Too bad Micheal Moore couldn't throw together a "documentary" showing us just that.

But, hmmm, who else was fooled?

I have said publicly for years that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein pose a real and grave threat to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. Saddam Hussein's record bears this out.

I have talked about that record. Iraq never fully accounted for the major gaps and inconsistencies in declarations provided to the inspectors of the pre-Gulf war weapons of mass destruction program, nor did the Iraq regime provide credible proof that it had completely destroyed its weapons and production infrastructure.

He has continually failed to meet the obligations imposed by the international community on Iraq at the end of the Persian Gulf the Iraqi regime provide credible proof war to declare and destroy its weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems and to forego the development of nuclear weapons. during the 7 years of weapons inspections, the Iraqi regime repeatedly frustrated the work of the UNSCOM--Special Commission--inspectors, culminating in 1998 in their ouster. Even during the period of inspections, Iraq never fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in declarations provided to the inspectors of its pre-gulf war WMD programs, nor did the Iraqi regime provide credible proof that it had completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.John Kerry (member of the Senate Intelligence Committee) - Senate Speech October 9, 2002

As for the point; a connection between Iraq and OBL -- I'll be looking for the video evidence sufficient to convince you. Even then, I think you would still believe it to be forged. This court case is interesting in its linkages, IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA - 9/11 Victims versus OBL, Al Queda, Taliban, Afghanistan and Iraq and I could offer you any number of descriptions for the activities of UNIT 999, but it really wouldn't matter, would it?

Or

Germany Expels Jordanian Said Linked to Zarqawi -- 8/27/2004
Germany has expelled a Jordanian suspected of links to a terrorist group run by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who is wanted for launching several attacks in Iraq, the Bavarian state interior ministry said Friday. The man, identified only as Osama A., was sent to a German prison in late 2002 on suspicion of belonging to Zarqawi's al-Tawhid group, but was released the following January. The Bavarian authorities said he is a danger to public order and safety and was responsible for gathering together donations for al-Tawhid in the area around Munich, southern Germany. He was expelled to Jordan. Al-Tawhid is accused of preparing a number of attacks against Jewish interests in Germany. Its stated aims are to overthrow the state of Jordan and kill all Jews. Osama A. came to Germany in 1996 claiming to be a refugee from Iraq but his real identity was discovered some time later. Zarqawi, also a Jordanian, is suspected of ties to Osama bin Laden but unlike the Al-Qaeda network leader he has not appeared in video tapes. (AFP)

I don't know. It looks like a duck, and it quacks like a duck. So, I think it is a duck.

[Thecla]

If you are waiting for the video showing OBL and Saddam discussing how to best use Iraq's WMD stockpile on terror campaigns then you are right -- this evidence and intelligence is flimsy.

Yup, I'll be waiting a long time, especially since Iraq had no stockpiles of WMDs.

As for the point; a connection between Iraq and OBL -- I'll be looking for the video evidence sufficient to convince you. Even then, I think you would still believe it to be forged. This court case is interesting in its linkages, IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA - 9/11 Victims versus OBL, Al Queda, Taliban, Afghanistan and Iraq

Care to offer any substantiation of the many "reported" "facts" here (nearly all of them unsupported or contradicted by the 9/11 commission report)? What is your estimate of the BS% of the following "Statement of Facts"?

23.            On information and belief, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the hijackers also received material support and assistance from Iraq, by and through its officials, agents, and/or employees, to carry out terrorist attacks on the United States, including the September 11, 2001 attacks.

26.            Between April 25 and May 1, 1998, two of Bin Laden’s senior military commanders, Muhammad Abu-Islam and Abdallah Qassim, reportedly visited Baghdad for discussions with Saddam Hussein’s son -- Qusay Hussein -- the “czar” of Iraqi intelligence matters.  Qusay Hussein’s participation in the meetings highlights the importance of the talks in both symbolic and practical terms.  As a direct result of these meetings, Iraq reportedly made commitments to provide training, intelligence, clandestine Saudi border crossings, and weapons and explosives to support Al Qaeda.

27.            By mid-June, 1998, operatives of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda reportedly were at the al-Nasiriyah training camp in Iraq receiving instruction and training from Iraqi intelligence and military officials on reconnaissance and targeting American facilities and installations for terrorist attacks.  Another group of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives from Saudi Arabia reportedly were trained by intelligence officials in Iraq to smuggle weapons and explosives into Saudi Arabia, and, upon returning to Saudi Arabia, successfully smuggled weapons and explosives into that country.  A third group of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives reportedly received a month of sophisticated guerrilla operations training from Iraqi intelligence officials later in the Summer of 1998.

28.            Bin Laden reportedly sought to strengthen and reinforce the support he and Al Qaeda  received from Iraq.  In mid-July 1998, Bin Laden reportedly sent Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian co-founder of Al Qaeda, to Iraq to meet with senior Iraqi officials, including Iraqi vice president Taha Yassin Ramadan.  The reported purpose of this meeting was to discuss and plan a joint strategy for a terrorist campaign against the United States.  Iraqi officials reportedly pledged Iraq’s full support and cooperation on the condition that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda not incite the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamic organization, against the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.  Zawahiri reportedly toured a potential site for a new headquarters for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda near al-Fallujah in Iraq and observed training by Iraqi intelligence officials of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives at al-Nasiriyah.  In recognition of Bin Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s leadership role in the terrorist war against the United States, Iraqi officials allowed Zawahiri to assume formal command over the al-Nasiriyah training camp in the name of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.


29.            By mid-November 1998, Saddam Hussein reportedly came to the conclusion (with the advice and prompting of his son and intelligence chief, Qusay), that a campaign of terrorist attacks against the United States, under the banner of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, was the most effective means of deflecting U.S. attempts to topple his regime.

30.            Shortly thereafter, Iraqi intelligence officials reportedly met with Bin Laden in Afghanistan.  Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and Iraq reportedly agreed to join efforts in a detailed, coordinated plan for a protracted terrorist war against the United States.  Iraq also reportedly agreed to provide Bin Laden and Al Qaeda with the assistance of an expert in chemical weapons, and Bin Laden reportedly agreed to hunt down Iraqi opposition leaders who cooperated with the United States against Hussein.  In furtherance of this agreement, Bin Laden reportedly dispatched four hundred of Al Qaeda’s “Afghan” Arabs to Iraq to fight Kurds.

31.           Following a four day air strike by the United States in December 1998, Iraqi trade minister Muhammad Mahdi Salah reportedly stated that he expected terrorist activities against the United States to increase as a result of the bombing of Iraq.  The Arabic language daily newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi first raised the issue of cooperation between Iraq, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in a late December 1998 editorial, which predicted that “President Saddam Hussein, whose country was subjected to a four day air strike, will look for support in taking revenge on the United States and Britain by cooperating with Saudi oppositionist Osama bin-Laden, whom the United States considers to be the most wanted person in the world.”  The editorial noted that this type of cooperation was very likely considering that “bin-Laden was planning moving to Iraq before the recent strike.”


32.           Following the December 1998 air strikes, Saddam Hussein reportedly dispatched Faruq al-Hijazi to Kandahar, Afghanistan in order to meet with Bin Laden.  Hijazi, the former deputy chief of Iraqi intelligence, had first met Bin Laden in 1994.  During his visit to Kandahar, Hijazi reportedly offered expanded cooperation and assistance to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, as well as a re-extension of the offer of shelter and hospitality Iraq previously extended to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.  Bin Laden reportedly agreed in principle to give Iraq assistance in a revenge campaign against the United States, but suggested further study and coordination before committing to a specific course of action or agreeing to a particular terrorist strike. 

33.            To demonstrate Iraq’s commitment to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, Hijazi reportedly presented Bin Laden with a pack of blank, official Yemeni passports, supplied to Iraqi intelligence from their Yemeni contacts.  Hijazi’s visit to Kandahar was reportedly followed by a contingent of Iraqi military intelligence officials who provided additional training and instruction to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan.  These Iraqi officials reportedly included members of “Unit 999,” a group of elite, Iraqi intelligence officials who provided advanced sabotage and infiltration training and instruction for Al Qaeda operatives. 

34.            In addition to the al-Nasiriyah training camp, by January 1999, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives also were reportedly being trained by Iraqi intelligence and military officers at training camps on the outskirts of Baghdad.

35.           Following the Hijazi meetings, Qusay Hussein reportedly dispatched representatives to follow-up with Bin Laden and obtain his firm commitment to exact revenge against the United States for the December 1998 bombing campaign.  Iraq reportedly offered Bin Laden and Al Qaeda an open-ended commitment to joint operations against the United States and its “moderate” Arab allies in exchange for an absolute guarantee that Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and their allies would not attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. 


36.            Israeli sources reportedly claim that, for the past two years, Iraqi intelligence officers have been shuttling back and forth between Baghdad and Afghanistan.  According to the Israelis, one of these Iraqi intelligence officers, Salah Suleiman, was captured last October by Pakistani officials near the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

37.            In January 1999, Iraq reportedly began reorganizing and mobilizing intelligence front operations throughout Europe in support of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

38.            According to Czech intelligence sources, Mohammad Atta, the operational ringleader of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, met in June 2000 with Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, a consul and second secretary at the Iraqi embassy in Prague.  Al-Ani is one of Iraqi’s most highly decorated intelligence officers, a special forces veteran, and a senior leader of Iraq’s “M-8” special operations branch.  Other reports indicate that Al-Ani may have met with another hijacker, Khalid Almihdar. 

39.            Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross has confirmed that Atta met with al-Ani in early April 2001 in Prague.  Atta also reportedly met with the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey and the former Iraqi deputy intelligence director, Farouk al-Hijazi, in Prague sometime in early April 2001.

40.            Czech intelligence sources further report that Atta and al-Ani embraced upon meeting at Prague’s Ruzyne airport, and that Atta may have visited the Czech capitol on four other occasions.

41.            Czech intelligence sources also reported that al-Ani had been under surveillance because he had been observed apparently surveying the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague.  Czech authorities believed the site had been selected for attack by terrorists.  Later in 2001, al-Ani was expelled from the Czech Republic for espionage activities.


42.            Reports of additional intelligence ties between Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and Iraq continue to mount.  The CIA reportedly believes Iraq provided falsified passports for the nineteen hijackers who carried out the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  Further, senior U.S. intelligence sources have revealed that, in the Spring of 2001, Marwan al-Shehri and Ziad Jarrah -- two of Atta’s closest associates and members of the Al Qaeda “cell” in the Federal Republic of Germany -- met with known Iraqi intelligence agents outside the United States.

43.            Italian security sources have reported that Iraq made use of its embassy in Rome to foster and cultivate Iraq’s partnership with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.  Habib Faris Abdullah al-Mamouri, a general in the Iraqi secret service, and, from 1982 to 1990, a member of Iraq’s “M-A” special operations branch charged with developing links with Islamist militants in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the states of the Persian Gulf, was stationed in Rome as an “instructor” for Iraqi diplomats.  Al-Mamouri reportedly met with Mohammed Atta in Rome, Hamburg, and Prague.  Al-Mamouri has not been seen in Rome since July 2001, shortly after he last met with Atta.

44.            Recent Iraqi defectors provide additional details of Iraq’s support for international terrorism throughout the 1990s.  The Public Broadcasting Service documentary program entitled “Frontline” interviewed former Iraqi intelligence and army officers with first-hand accounts of highly secret installations run by an international terrorist known to Iraqi staffers only as “the Ghost.”  “The Ghost” is reported to be Abdel Hussein, the chief trainer at a training camp inside Iraq, which includes the fuselage of a Boeing 707 jetliner that is used to practice hijacking scenarios.  U.N. inspectors independently confirmed the existence of this particular training camp inside Iraq. 

45.            The Iraqi defector known as “Saddam’s Bomb-maker,” Dr. Khidhir Hamza, who served as Iraq’s Director of Nuclear Weaponization, analyzes Iraqi’s sponsorship of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda as follows:


What I think is there is somehow a change in the level of the type of operation Bin Laden has been carrying [out]. What we are looking at initially is more or less just attempts to blow some buildings, just normal use of explosives for a terrorist. What we have in the September 11 operation, [is a] tightly controlled, very sophisticated operation; the type an Iraqi intelligence agency, well versed in the technology [could pull off]. ... So my thinking is a guy sitting in a cave in Afghanistan is not the guy who will do an operation of this caliber. It has to have in combination with it a guy with the sophistication and know-how on how to carry these things.


. . . Iraq [also] has a history of training terrorists, harboring them, and taking good care of them, by the way. A terrorist is well cared for with Saddam. So he has a good reputation in that type of community, if you like.


46.            Several leading authorities on Saddam Hussein, Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda concur on the likelihood of Iraq’s sponsorship and coordination of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  The former head of Israel’s Mossad secret service, Rafi Eitan, and former CIA Director James Woolsey, share the view that Iraq, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda conspired in the attacks.  Their views also are shared by Laurie Mylroie, an academic and Iraqi affairs expert at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C..  Mylroie cites the role of Iraqi operatives in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center to support her claim that the September 11, 2001 attacks are a matter of unfinished business for Iraq, which considers itself to be at war with the United States.


On information and belief, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the hijackers also received material support and assistance from Iraq, by and through its officials, agents, and/or employees, to carry out terrorist attacks on the United States, including the September 11, 2001 attacks

[Occhidiangela]

Most of the material we are discussion is partial coverage of a subject. Facts selected specifically for how they shape the understanding of a topic.

Just like the way a lawyer presents facts in a court room.

If not an outright lie, a half truth.

Hence, the need for a salt shaker. Or, a salt lick, in the case of Mr Moore or that other fat guy, or used to be fat guy, Rush Limbaugh. ;)

[Sir_Die_alot]

And New York City is, geographically speaking, much smaller than Holland. Does that mean there is proportionally less diversity of opinion? Or even less at all? I don't think that argument makes any sense.

That's my point right there. Small geographic areas that are densly populated where people don't think "the same but the majority of people who live in an area tend to think similarly" (You and eppi left out this very important line when quoting me, I hope it was an oversight and not an attempt to take me out of context). Even with people who disagree there are fundamental cultural agreements that obviously spill into politics. I find it interesting that you, a Canadian, whose country was almost voted to split in 2 not so long ago would argue this point.

As for America go do a google search for "red and blue states". If our elections were held on geographic opinions, Bush would have this in the bag by hundreds of square miles. However birth rates do matter in elections (Breathe Jester, breathe!). On a side note if you ever wondered where our civil war came from; that's it.

[kandrathe]

I was looking for a non-US source for the Chechyan school take over, as it seems my usual reliable source, Al Jazeera, is mute about it today.

I discovered that Pravda is actually a really wacky paper. It makes our supermarket tabloids look tame.

If you want a good chuckle, check out their human interest stories.

[eppie]

sorry for quoting you wrong but I just think there is not such a huge differene in opinion in the US. For me as an outsider, like I said, the elefant and the donkey to me are almost the same species.

As for America go do a google search for "red and blue states". If our elections were held on geographic opinions, Bush would have this in the bag by hundreds of square miles. However birth rates do matter in elections (Breathe Jester, breathe!). On a side note if you ever wondered where our civil war came from; that's it.

I know I just saw the scheme in newsweek. I got a different conclusion though. (and sorry if somebody feels insulted) What I thought was "all the economically important states (except for Texas) are Kerry states while most of the farmer states are Bush supporting. (that's where you get your square miles)"

Anyway, if according to you there is so much difference in opinion, why are there only two parties that play a role?.

By the way I just saw on the news a part about the republican convention (the part with schwarzennegger).
The things arnie said made be become really scared. I just hope the rest of the republican doesn't see things the same way. The things he said about the UN and that it is better that the US arranges things made me wonder if he just doesn't want to have a world dictatorship led by the US. More scary was the huge applause from all the people that were present.
If we get 4 more years of Bush, I guess better realtions with other countries are out of the question.

[Thecla]

Facts selected specifically for how they shape the understanding of a topic.

Any facts have to be interpreted within a broader framework.

The framework here is that the Bush administration, or key members of it at any rate, was determined to go after Iraq from the day it took office. After 9/11 happened, they exploited the threat of terrorism to sell the Iraq war by arguing: a) Iraq was working with al Qaeda; b) Iraq possessed WMDs; c) there was an immanent threat of Iraq providing al Qaeda with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. To do so they exaggerated every piece of evidence in favor of these arguments, however unreliable the sources, and ignored everything else. They didn't care about truth, they just wanted to sell the war -- and they were successful in doing that in the US as the above poll numbers attest. As it turns out, Iraq didn't have WMDs and it wasn't working with al Qaeda. However, the administration probably doesn't care too much about that since terrorism was never their principle reason for going to war.

[Sir_Die_alot]

For me as an outsider, like I said, the elefant and the donkey to me are almost the same species.

BINGO! Now think how your country looks to an outsider. :D

I got a different conclusion though. (and sorry if somebody feels insulted) What I thought was "all the economically important states (except for Texas) are Kerry states while most of the farmer states are Bush supporting. (that's where you get your square miles)"

Not a different opinion at all, unless you are trying to say they are stupid. :)

Anyway, if according to you there is so much difference in opinion, why are there only two parties that play a role?.

That's just how it has worked itself out. :P Power in numbers I suppose, but which you belong to usually has more to do with what you want politically rather than socially. There is really only 2 ways to go politically left or right, after that it's more about how than what. There are up sides and down sides to this arrangement, but we haven't tried to split the country apart for over 100 years so it's working for us. B)

If you want my honest opinion I think a 3rd major party is ready to be born if the right politician(s) would start one, because the Democrat party is becoming more and more fractured (See the keynote speaker for the Republican convention) and spilling into the Republicans. Kerry was a stupid choice for Democrats. I have no doubt Lieberman would be up 5 (maybe even 10) points now, but he was a distant 3rd (maybe 4th?) in the primarys.

By the way I just saw on the news a part about the republican convention (the part with schwarzennegger).
The things arnie said made be become really scared. I just hope the rest of the republican doesn't see things the same way. The things he said about the UN and that it is better that the US arranges things made me wonder if he just doesn't want to have a world dictatorship led by the US. More scary was the huge applause from all the people that were present.

Take in context what America is. Just as Kerry is the no more Bush cantidate, so is America is the no more (insert country here) country. The largest immigrations of people here came when they were tired of their own government's limitations or oppressions. How then do you think people, and people desended from people, who think like this would feel about involvment from their old country in their new country's decisions? As I said like 3 posts ago people in regions tend to think alike, and one thing most Americans do think alike on is independance. One of Kerry's biggest problems politically, is somehow balancing how he can say he will involve the UN more but without stating the opposite of the above, which would kill any hope he has for the presidancy. (If that really stuck, it would be a huge loss)

[kandrathe]

The framework here is that the Bush administration, or key members of it at any rate, was determined to go after Iraq from the day it took office.

Clinton, along with any number of democrats, wanted to go after Iraq as well after they tossed out Richard Butler in 1998, but they were thwarted by the Republicans in Congress.

As it turns out, Iraq didn't have WMDs and it wasn't working with al Qaeda.

If you say it enough, it must be true.

[Jester]

"Even with people who disagree there are fundamental cultural agreements that obviously spill into politics. I find it interesting that you, a Canadian, whose country was almost voted to split in 2 not so long ago would argue this point."

I didn't say anything at all about "fundamental cultural agreements". It would be ridiculous to claim that culture is not a strong determinant force in opinion. What I disagree with is that this has anything to do with the land area of the region being considered. Does Portugal have less or more diversity of opinion than China? Than the American midwest? Than Paris, or Bangkok? Quebec? Who cares how large the areas are? What matters is the cultural, not geographic, homogeneity.

Jester

[Minionman]

Than the American midwest?

Yes, Portugal may have more or less cultural diversity than the midwest in the U.S. Just be careful if stereotyping such big parts of the U.S. in any way.

[Minionman]

Anyway, if according to you there is so much difference in opinion, why are there only two parties that play a role?.

A lot of opinions come together to make one party. For example, Republicans right now are in general a combination of pro buisiness, like running the culture of the country (abortion, pornography laws, crime strategies, gun control), like keeping spending down, and other issues that I can't think of right now. Someone who supports the Republican party might possibly be mostly probuisiness and keeping spending down, but not like cultural restrictions, while someone else might support them only for the cultural restrictions but not care about economics, another person might simply have party loyalty. Democrats work the same way. In total, the two parties both have a lot of different sections to them.

Maybe the parties in the Netherlands work the same way or maybe not. But the last paragraph says how the U.S. can be split into more than 2 opinions and still only have 2 major parties. I think England works in a similar way, and there are probably other countries like that too.

On an untrelated, random thought note, wouldn't it be ironic if a lot of people in Nevada vote for people because they don't like "moral decay" considering a lot of Nevada's economy comes from "moral decay"? Just a random thought, there are probably people like this, which I can understand, but i just feltt like writing this random thought down.