12-14-2005, 03:45 AM
Thecla, that is indeed the question.
Is it "control," like the Pax Americana found in Europe post WW II (and an edgy peace at best for a while there) or was it something far different, made in three parts? I see it a bit differently than Mr Pinter, although he is on the right track.
1. An attempt to increase the security of Israel and thus change the roadmap of "Mid East" peace.
2. An attempt to preempt the renewed development (by Saddam) of his various weapons programs after the predicted Republican defeat in the 2004 election, which programs are perceived as a destabalizing force in the middle east. Never mind that such programs keep Iran in check and only threaten Israel, if anyone . . . they are "destabalizing."
3. An attempt to "stabalize" the Middle East by force due to a loss of patience of work via collective security organs and . . . wait for it . . . a distressing lack of state craft.
When you consider that American Security policy for a decade was filled with such idiotic statements as "instability is the new threat to NATO" (General Shalikashvili, NATO commander under Clinton before Clark) and policies in the Balkans that tried to slap a bandaid of "stability" onto that part of the world
Add the importance of oil to the global economy
Add Intafada openly supported by Iraq, and others,
It almost makes sense to try to stabalize the world's most critical oil supply region, or help provide security, and hence stability, to it.
Almost, except for a few small problems
You attract more flies with honey than vinegar
International statecraft takes patience, persistance, and imagination.
The big dog in the Persian Gulf is, and has been for some years, Iran.
At which point it makes no sense.
Occhi
Quote:an act intended to consolidate American military and economic control of the Middle East
Is it "control," like the Pax Americana found in Europe post WW II (and an edgy peace at best for a while there) or was it something far different, made in three parts? I see it a bit differently than Mr Pinter, although he is on the right track.
1. An attempt to increase the security of Israel and thus change the roadmap of "Mid East" peace.
2. An attempt to preempt the renewed development (by Saddam) of his various weapons programs after the predicted Republican defeat in the 2004 election, which programs are perceived as a destabalizing force in the middle east. Never mind that such programs keep Iran in check and only threaten Israel, if anyone . . . they are "destabalizing."
3. An attempt to "stabalize" the Middle East by force due to a loss of patience of work via collective security organs and . . . wait for it . . . a distressing lack of state craft.
When you consider that American Security policy for a decade was filled with such idiotic statements as "instability is the new threat to NATO" (General Shalikashvili, NATO commander under Clinton before Clark) and policies in the Balkans that tried to slap a bandaid of "stability" onto that part of the world
Add the importance of oil to the global economy
Add Intafada openly supported by Iraq, and others,
It almost makes sense to try to stabalize the world's most critical oil supply region, or help provide security, and hence stability, to it.
Almost, except for a few small problems
You attract more flies with honey than vinegar
International statecraft takes patience, persistance, and imagination.
The big dog in the Persian Gulf is, and has been for some years, Iran.
At which point it makes no sense.
Occhi
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete