And now: Syria

[Occhidiangela]

Since 1992 Maastricht, as I recall, the French initiative to create a more independent security identity, be it WEU, Eurocorps, what have you, has been supported by many in Europe. It has also been

All Hot Air ((Edited: I looked up my Maritime Guard facts.)

with the exception of Operation Sharp Fence. In support of the 1992-1993 phase of the WEU maritime embargo of Yugoslavia. (That operation was an eerie replay of the arms embargo of 1936-1936 versus the Republican movement in Spain.) NATO and WEU joined efforts and combined the Operation into the Sharp Guard arms embargo and trade embargo in June of 1993. (<== That was one of the details I had hosed up.)

FWIW, Maritime Guard Synopsis)
Belgians in Sharp Fence Sharp Fence lasted from, IIRC, July 92 to June 93.

For a fuller family tree explanation:

Operation Sharp Guard

The NATO alliance had a similar awakening, and suffered a similarly steep learning curve, during the history-making events involving the Former Yugoslavia. In July 1992, NATO Operation Maritime Monitor and Western European Union (WEU) Operation Sharp Vigilance were initiated as monitoring operations in accordance with existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. On 22 November 1992 these became known as Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence, respectively, when the U.N. added enforcement as a mission. Finally, on 15 June 1993, these two operations were merged into one, unity of command was assigned to the Commander of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH), and the name was changed to Operation Sharp Guard. This enforcement activity consumed the combined efforts of two of NATO's Standing Naval Forces (Atlantic and Mediterranean) and the WEU Task Group for 36 months until Sharp Guard was suspended on 19 June 1996.

Sharp Guard presented the Allies with the classic challenge of producing and managing an accurate and timely Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) over a wide sea area. Its key objectives were:

-Detect all ships in the Southern Adriatic Sea and its approaches,
-Maintain the picture of which ships have been challenged and which have not,
-Take appropriate action against any ship deemed suspect, and
-Prevent blockade-runners from delivering prohibited items into a Serbian port.

The two ops were combined when the various NATO politicians decided to quit their posturing and adapt the KISS principle. However, it is worth noting that for political reasons, the WEU Flotilla remained as a discrete force offering under WEU auspices. This had zero military value, but immense political value: it allowed the French to play without having to put their forces under NATO 'pure' command. "In but out."

No one has coughed up the resources to make the European Independent Security Identity work, though quite a bit of political work has been done to 'fall in on' pre existing NATO structures when Europe decides to act and the US demures. That work continues, however, the throny problem of 'paying the freight' (25 Cents on every dollar spent in NATO comes from Washington, roughly) has political ramifications in all NATO capitals.

Hence, when the Europeans wanted to get serious about Bosnia, they had to play the NATO card, since the EU and WEU cards, played by the insipid UN RoE conventions, simply did not work. Peace Enforcement and Peace Keeping are not the same thing. When they wanted to get serious about Kosovo and Serbia, they had to ask Big Brother Clinton to make it possible. That is 'suckling at the nipple' writ large.

My point is, the idea of an independent European Security Identity has great merit. The resources, the organization, and the wealth are there, in Europe, to make it possible. What is lacking is the political will, to date.

The politicians have not shown the balls to put the money where their mouths are, as they are afraid that their populations, after two generations of getting subsidized security, will reject having to pay their own way. Hence, they continue to suckle on the American security nipple, which strikes me as a tad hypocritical given the rhetoric of the past 10 years or so.

On the American side, the opinions are very divided, depending on who you talk to. One reason is that we are still in transition as reagards our relationship with Russia. As that changes for the better, Europe north of the Alps no longer needs our protection. The other is that with the infrastructure in place, any assistance we are called on to provide to Europe, when it wants our help, is 'right there' and does not need to wait a few weeks to cross the pond.

So, while the French talk a good line, they don't back it up with their resources. One carrier not available all year round does not a rapid reaction force make. A Eurocorps, that is in truth a mythical force, is also not a credible instrument of collective policy, nor of collective security.

In 10 years time, though, the idea may actually have come to fruition. We are still seeing the wrestling, internal to various European parliaments, about how far they will finance their own security, and how much is enough. In any case, it will be done collectively, either in NATO or under EU or WEU: that habit of 50 years, and the relationships already built, stand them all in good stead.

What is lacking is the collective political will to pay the freight, to finance strategic lift, large muscle logistics, and credible power projection capability. At present.