09-12-2004, 04:57 AM
(This post was last modified: 09-12-2004, 05:02 AM by Occhidiangela.)
About alleged coordination or cooperation that may have taken place between Saddam's agents and Al Qaeda operatives, gekko. I do not make that claim. I imagine that story still has a few chapers left in it. So too the decision tree that led to war. That story is not all told.
The point I am trying to make, that I hope you are getting, is that looking 5-10 years down stream and making a decision that will change conditions for the better in the time window is a responsibility of government.
It is a risk/benifits decision.
The decision to head off to Afghanistan was a no brainer. The decision to use force to take out Saddam Hussein was a considerable risk. The risk was that the aftermath would break Iraq into smaller pieces, which puts Iran into an even stronger position in the Gulf region. That prospect does not make ANY of the Gulf States comfortable.
The pressures in place were not getting the job done vis a vis Iraq, craven ness on the part of many UN members being a root cause of failure, the cracks in the will of the UN/Coalition had been obvious since about . . . 1995. Lack of a united front painted a forecast of failure of collective, to include but not limited to, Security Council will. The cracks in the collective will sent Saddam a message that if he played the long game, he would prevail. That fella made a career out of prevailing. As to the cracks in the coalition, take a look at the loopholes in the Oil for Food program, the oil embargo, Syrian oil leaks, smuggling, and the information campaign waged againt the US over the looting of Iraq oil revenue by everyone but the US while the US, UK and Canada maintained economic sanctions.
A failed course of action is generally not smart to sustain. So, come up with a new one.
Was war and attack the ONLY other course of action? I don't think so.
Was there a better one that might work? I have yet to come up with one, given the tools at hand particularly given the economic incentives to quit were overpowering to more than one European government. Any number of courses of action that would not have worked have been suggested.
Doing nothing is not a viable course of action for anyone trying to make positive change to the security question of the Persian Gulf.
Occhi
The point I am trying to make, that I hope you are getting, is that looking 5-10 years down stream and making a decision that will change conditions for the better in the time window is a responsibility of government.
It is a risk/benifits decision.
The decision to head off to Afghanistan was a no brainer. The decision to use force to take out Saddam Hussein was a considerable risk. The risk was that the aftermath would break Iraq into smaller pieces, which puts Iran into an even stronger position in the Gulf region. That prospect does not make ANY of the Gulf States comfortable.
The pressures in place were not getting the job done vis a vis Iraq, craven ness on the part of many UN members being a root cause of failure, the cracks in the will of the UN/Coalition had been obvious since about . . . 1995. Lack of a united front painted a forecast of failure of collective, to include but not limited to, Security Council will. The cracks in the collective will sent Saddam a message that if he played the long game, he would prevail. That fella made a career out of prevailing. As to the cracks in the coalition, take a look at the loopholes in the Oil for Food program, the oil embargo, Syrian oil leaks, smuggling, and the information campaign waged againt the US over the looting of Iraq oil revenue by everyone but the US while the US, UK and Canada maintained economic sanctions.
A failed course of action is generally not smart to sustain. So, come up with a new one.
Was war and attack the ONLY other course of action? I don't think so.
Was there a better one that might work? I have yet to come up with one, given the tools at hand particularly given the economic incentives to quit were overpowering to more than one European government. Any number of courses of action that would not have worked have been suggested.
Doing nothing is not a viable course of action for anyone trying to make positive change to the security question of the Persian Gulf.
Occhi
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete