10-31-2006, 07:31 PM
Quote:The Bushehr reactor (which Russia assisted Iran in putting up) is exempted from some IAEA limitations. The article below suggests that this exception, doubtless endorsed by UNSC member Russia, is a viable path toward a weaponized atomic weapon (plutnium it seems) in Iran in the short term, not the 3-5 year term.
Is this reporter crying wolf? Is the UNSC once again having trouble with consensus due to inter party agenda mongering? Mr Stephens is somehow privy to a confidential document, which raises the question of his article: How does he know, and who leaked this to him?
From WSJ.com
Wall Street Journal October 31, 2006
Giving Iran The Bomb By Bret Stephens
Once Iran has the bomb, what happens to balance of power in the Persian Gulf? Note the use of the words "material breach" regarding a WMD, exactly the same words use vis a vis Saddam.
Occhi
One one hand, it sounds like the author is crying wolf over Iran receiving a Nuclear Reactor. It's my understanding that almost all "nuclear power plant grade" plutonium, can be enriched rather quickly into weapons grade plutonium. The possibility is there to 'easily' convert it, but only because the plutonium usable in a reactor is by its very nature 'easily' convertable to weapons grade.
On the other hand, Iran is a country obviously willing to convert plutonium into weapons grade, if given the chance.
I'm more interested in the rationale behind allowing Iran Nuclear Power in the first place. Seems like a terrible idea to give any material usable in a nuclear weapon (even if its a different "grade") to a country where there is fear of creating a nuclear weapon.
Kind of like giving a hand gun to a kid and telling him it's only for hammering nails.
Pardon the over simplification of the issue, but I'm having quite a hard time getting past the need for Iran to have nuclear power in the first place.
Cheers,
Munk