The new old war in Korea

[Lissa]

The KN-2-Toska is said to be very accurate and has a fairly good range for a short range missile. NK is also said to have a good number of them. They could easily be used to do some damage to air fields making them unusable.

By "fairly good range", you mean 110 Km. That couldn't hit 80% of South Korea, and it wouldn't come even close to hitting targets on the southeast coast. For that, they need their modified Scuds, and the accuracy on those things is terrible.

-Jester

Edit: Perhaps I don't have the right missile - I hardly get any results for "KN-2 Toska" in google. Is there a different KN-2?

Edit of Edit: Ah! Toksa! And yes, it's a piece of junk, relative to what they'd need for what you're proposing. And they have 50 of them - even if they bullseyed every runway, they wouldn't do enough damage.

It's not just the Toska though, the Hwasong 6 can almost hit the Japanese coast and they have roughly 700 of them. While the CEP isn't great (50m), they have enough to cause general issues with any number of air fields in South Korea. Here is as complete a list of the NK Missile Inventory that is readily available to us. NK's ICBM suck, but a few of their short and medium range missiles aren't bad.

Hm, I'm certainly no expert on missile technology, but just from the information found after following up on your link (nothing in the paragraphs you linked said anything about NK missile accuracy regarding runways or similar structures, by the way), it would appear that NK has a lot of ballistic missiles with inertial guidance systems, which are, from what I've read, nowhere near accurate enough to reliable cripple South Korean airbases.

Inertial guidance systems can be quite accurate. I don't know of another system that would be suitable for war missiles (ballistic or cruise). The EMP from one big high altitude nuke can take out almost all the ground based and a lot of the space based electronics.

However, quite accurate is a relative term. Runways are small targets. Twenty years ago, I would have expected a CEP (circular error probable) of about 15 to 20 meters. Roughly speaking, that means three or four missiles per runway to get one crater. Runways are also pretty hard targets. A handy pile of gravel, a bulldozer, and some PSP, and that runway can be back in service in a matter of hours.

Right, but the time waiting for that could be enough for the first striking force. Even with as dilapitated as the NK air force is, if they can have a couple hours of free reign, it might help them get a solid push and keep SK and US forces on the defensive.

However, quite accurate is a relative term. Runways are small targets. Twenty years ago, I would have expected a CEP (circular error probable) of about 15 to 20 meters. Roughly speaking, that means three or four missiles per runway to get one crater. Runways are also pretty hard targets. A handy pile of gravel, a bulldozer, and some PSP, and that runway can be back in service in a matter of hours.

Plus, I would add that it's not like South Korea has 5 bases and each one has one runway or something. This link shows that they have quite a few airbases and to reach the level of being completely pinned down that Lissa is proposing a significant number of those would need to be shut down.

With over 700 missiles available TD, the NKs could easily throw 25 missiles at any of the bases and dual use runways and still have plenty for the auxilary runways (that appear to be hardened roadways). That would be enough to cause enough damage to shutdown the SK and US air forces in Korea until the runways are repaired. And given it will take atleast an hour for planes to get on station from either the US carriers in the region or from the US bases in Japan and Okinawa, it's not that much of a stretch.

Lissa, overall I think you're just reaching too far. You're assuming that basically everything goes right for North Korea and that everything goes poorly for South Korea. A couple of those assumptions might be ok on their own but to assume that Seoul would be in flames and every South Korean runway disabled within the initial salvo, South Korea has no planned response for such an obvious North Korean initial attack and the US and South Korea were caught by surprise and are completely unprepared for the attack seems just shy of impossible.

Maybe, the thing is, if NK is going to first strike, it's going to be an alpha which means they're going to throw everything along with the kitchen sink at SK to disable and destroy as much of SKs forces as possible. I don't think that is too far of an assumption. How well the alpha strike goes over is something else entirely, but the concept of the first strike from NK isn't out of hand. And yes, I'm sure the SK and US forces have planned and made contingencies, it's more a matter of how well NK executes (and evidently, since 2000, the NK has been picking up their training.


Also, here's an article I came across. Not sure if it's propaganda or not (it's written by a Korean, not sure if they're North or South), but it is an interesting read and shows some of the North's capabilities.

[TheDragoon]

With over 700 missiles available TD, the NKs could easily throw 25 missiles at any of the bases and dual use runways and still have plenty for the auxilary runways (that appear to be hardened roadways). That would be enough to cause enough damage to shutdown the SK and US air forces in Korea until the runways are repaired. And given it will take atleast an hour for planes to get on station from either the US carriers in the region or from the US bases in Japan and Okinawa, it's not that much of a stretch.

I would think that it is likely that launching over 700 missiles could take a long time, too. Just because they have that many missiles doesn't mean that they have that many launchers (interestingly, I haven't seen a good discussion of launch capability and such online). I would guess at least some missiles are in storage or share launch platforms.

How well the alpha strike goes over is something else entirely, but the concept of the first strike from NK isn't out of hand.

I think that's the point that Pete and I have been making.

Also, here's an article I came across. Not sure if it's propaganda or not (it's written by a Korean, not sure if they're North or South), but it is an interesting read and shows some of the North's capabilities.

It sounds like the sort of propaganda that North Korea likes to send out, so I would guess that's where it is from. They like to claim that they're much more powerful than they actually are.

[kandrathe]

Lissa, overall I think you're just reaching too far.

Pick your best strategist, from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz. All council to consider the worst case scenario, and never underestimate your opponent. Clever opponents will surprise you, no matter how well you plan. You have the 4th largest military in the world, 80% of which is poised on a 100 mi wide chunk of land. The entire purpose of North Korea is a military that maintain the fortress. They don't do much other than that.

If I were in command... I'd move two or three CVBG's into closer proximity for some well announced joint "war games" with our Asian allies.

[Jester]

Lissa, overall I think you're just reaching too far.

Pick your best strategist, from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz. All council to consider the worst case scenario, and never underestimate your opponent.

They tell you to know your opponent. That doesn't mean assuming everything they do is going to go right. It means correctly assessing them - both their strengths and weaknesses. If you don't have an accurate sense of what the North Korean military will likely fail at, then you don't know how to exploit those probable failures, which is, of course, something else all the great strategists tell you how to do.

You have the 4th largest military in the world, 80% of which is poised on a 100 mi wide chunk of land. The entire purpose of North Korea is a military that maintain the fortress. They don't do much other than that.

This is really the key point. North Korea is a fortress. The North Korean military is so well-integrated and so well dug in, that breaking those defenses down will be difficult. They have carefully laid out plans for any attack contingency. But when they leave that fortress, their defensive advantages vanish, and they're vulnerable being outmanoevered, bombed, and otherwise disrupted in ways that are the speciality of highly mobile modern forces. I highly doubt that their rigid doctrines will serve them well outside of their fortress state, and in terms of adaptability, I think the South has a large edge.

-Jester

[kandrathe]

I highly doubt that their rigid doctrines will serve them well outside of their fortress state, and in terms of adaptability, I think the South has a large edge.

Actually, in this case I don't see either side with an edge. Both sides have troops that have lived with a status quo for 50 years. Really, only the US and some few allies have modern warfare experience. Yet, even experience didn't stop us from making stupid strategic mistakes in Korea, Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan. And, even now I doubt we've really learned our lesson yet about letting politics interfere with national security.

[--Pete]

Hi,

Yet, even experience didn't stop us from making stupid strategic mistakes in Korea, Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan. And, even now I doubt we've really learned our lesson yet about letting politics interfere with national security.

I don't think those qualify as strategic mistakes. Almost all the decisions that have led to those mistakes have been political. I think in every one of those, the strategy was clear. The will to implement it was not.

The willingness to gamble with the lives of others in a game whose rules they're ignorant of is one of the most damning traits of modern politicians. Perhaps only those who've been fired at in the line of duty should get a vote in the conduct of a war.

--Pete

[Jester]

Yet, even experience didn't stop us from making stupid strategic mistakes in Korea, Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan. And, even now I doubt we've really learned our lesson yet about letting politics interfere with national security.

Korea was a long time ago, and a very different war. The overriding issue of potential war with the Soviets dictated a great deal about how that war was going to end. It also taught the North Koreans a hell of a lesson - they're going to level your country with bombers, and if you can't do something about that, you're pretty much screwed. How well they've learned that lesson, vs. how far modern air power has come, is an interesting question.

Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as Somalia to some extent, were all about occupation, rather than conventional war. Would the North Koreans still be able to fight after the back of their military regime was irrevocably broken? Would they even want to? I don't know. It would be an interesting test case for the power of ideological conditioning. But by the time it became a situation like Iraq or Afghanistan, the threat of a North Korean invasion would have been long ended. The big threat is their army, and that's not something they can hide very well.

The US is damn good at its primary role - blowing the hell out of opposing conventional forces. And that's exactly what North Korea has, big Soviet-style masses of tanks, troops, and artillery. Where the US seems to struggle is in adapting all that firepower to conflicts which do not have obvious enemies to smash. But, at least until it turns into an occupation, North Korea is a textbook case of the obvious enemy - you know who they are, where they are, what they are.

-Jester

[NuurAbSaal]

But maybe I missed something, a cracked rib kept me awake and I'm certainly not in my most reliable research mode.

Sorry to hear that. I hope you at least had fun cracking it

--Pete

Hell yeah, I'm playing Australian Rules Football now and it is the most fun I've ever had with any sports. But you get bumped a bit occasionally

take care
Tarabulus

[kandrathe]

Where the US seems to struggle is in adapting all that firepower to conflicts which do not have obvious enemies to smash.

Where the US or anyone has trouble is when the politicians get in the way of kicking butt, or when an insurgent opponent is intermingled into the general population where indiscriminate butt kicking leads to support for the insurgency.

We need to figure out that nuance between talking to them until their bored, and annihilation.

[Jester]

Where the US or anyone has trouble is when the politicians get in the way of kicking butt, or when an insurgent opponent is intermingled into the general population where indiscriminate butt kicking leads to support for the insurgency.

Those are two very different problems. One means you have to let the military off the leash to blow crap up on their own terms.

The second means fighting a different war in a different way, where the US's big "advantages" of a high-tech, high-firepower military, are potential liabilities. Fixing that problem is decidedly not the same as finding a balance between overwhelming and insufficient force. It's a a matter of developing a correct strategic understanding of the situation, and adapting tactics and even overall philosophy to solve the problem at hand, rather than the problem they might wish was at hand. The US' biggest problems (so it seems to me) have always been found there - fighting the wrong war, or fighting the right war in the wrong way.

-Jester

[--Pete]

Hi,

The second means fighting a different war in a different way, where the US's big "advantages" of a high-tech, high-firepower military, are potential liabilities. Fixing that problem is decidedly not the same as finding a balance between overwhelming and insufficient force. It's a a matter of developing a correct strategic understanding of the situation, and adapting tactics and even overall philosophy to solve the problem at hand, rather than the problem they might wish was at hand.

I'm going to go one step further. The problem is that many of those situations were not wars, they were police actions (and not just in name as Korea was). Combat soldiers are trained in how to destroy the enemy and take their land. They are not trained on how to control a population that's in turmoil, how to defuse situations instead of letting them explode.

We need an organization, possibly part of, possibly independent of, existing organizations. A cross between the military and the police. Sort of a super SWAT crossed with Sheriff Andy Jackson Taylor How we get that is left as an exercise to the reader.

--Pete

[kandrathe]

I'm going to go one step further. The problem is that many of those situations were not wars, they were police actions (and not just in name as Korea was). Combat soldiers are trained in how to destroy the enemy and take their land. They are not trained on how to control a population that's in turmoil, how to defuse situations instead of letting them explode.

Yes, there is that whole "nation building" part we claim we don't get involved in, but there it is, a necessary part of humanly getting the troops out once everything is destroyed. Perhaps, the inhumane part is having to destroy a nation, and drive their people to their knees in order to change the countries leadership (which may even be broadly unpopular). North Korean deprivation for the last 1/2 century is a glaring example of the failure of the UN.

We need an organization, possibly part of, possibly independent of, existing organizations. A cross between the military and the police. Sort of a super SWAT crossed with Sheriff Andy Jackson Taylor How we get that is left as an exercise to the reader.

As long as this is not a US organization, I would support the police portion (along with an occupational administrative and court system). However, the next best suggestion would be for it to be a division in the corrupted, and badly mismanaged United Nations. The SWAT portion should be a coordination between the UN police with the occupying army. The UN might be a solution if they put in some oversight, checks and balances, as well as streamline away some of the bureaucratic crap that makes them irrelevant and ineffective.

[--Pete]

Hi,

Perhaps, the inhumane part is having to destroy a nation . . . to change the countries leadership . . .

I'm sorry, but who says we have to? I can see going to war to defend ourselves (and I don't mean preemptive retaliation). I can, to a lesser extent, see going to war to defend our allies if they've been attacked. But to go to war to give some country a government that its population neither earned nor can support is not only wrong, it is stupid. "Every nation has the government it deserves." -- Joseph de Maistre 1811. Change must come from the inside.

As long as this is not a US organization, I would support the police portion (along with an occupational administrative and court system). However, the next best suggestion would be for it to be a division in the corrupted, and badly mismanaged United Nations. The SWAT portion should be a coordination between the UN police with the occupying army.

When I said a mixture of SWAT and Andy Jackson Taylor, I didn't mean separate people or groups. Perhaps I should have said a cross between Dirty Harry and Andy Jackson Taylor to make it clear that I was speaking of individuals and not of groups. I can see how my reference to SWAT could lead to your conclusion.

Extending it to administrative and judicial makes sense. A complete package to rule and control a country until the country is ready to rule itself. Unfortunately, the preparation for self rule (of the type we would accept) will take at least three generation. The problem with waiting that long is that that is the path to colonialism.

The UN might be a solution if they put in some oversight, checks and balances, as well as streamline away some of the bureaucratic crap that makes them irrelevant and ineffective.

Right. The UN might be a solution if it weren't the UN.

First, the UN is saddled with its historic origin. Being the child of the allied victory in WW II, its structure reflects the powers of that time (plus France). It is that very structure that makes it "irrelevant and ineffective." Second, the UN has no source of income that it can enforce. Without that, it can hardly recruit and train the forces needed for the 'pacification' of all the trouble spots of the world. And, third, the UN has, other than a couple of blocks in NYC, no territory of its own. Not an insurmountable problem, but just where are these troops to be trained and garrisoned without becoming part of the country they are stationed in?

No, much like the old joke of jacking up the hood ornament and putting a new car under it, the best thing to do with the UN is to throw away everything but the name and rebuild it from the ground up. And I see no real probability of that happening for a long time to come.

(Disclaimer: there are organizations sponsored by the UN which do a lot of good worldwide. It is my feeling that these organizations largely work in spite of rather than because of the UN. The only significant thing the UN contributes to these organizations is neutrality beyond what any country based organization can project.)

--Pete

[kandrathe]

Perhaps, the inhumane part is having to destroy a nation . . . to change the countries leadership . . .

I'm sorry, but who says we have to? I can see going to war to defend ourselves (and I don't mean preemptive retaliation). I can, to a lesser extent, see going to war to defend our allies if they've been attacked. But to go to war to give some country a government that its population neither earned nor can support is not only wrong, it is stupid. "Every nation has the government it deserves." -- Joseph de Maistre 1811. Change must come from the inside.

Yeah, I don't mean preemptive either. I think our wars comes from a few reasons; 1) we have a vested interest (e.g. huge investment) that is threatened, 2) we have an ally who messed up or gets attacked, 3) humanitarian crisis that we cannot sit idly by and watch, or 4) we get attacked. Iraq doesn't fit that mold. Afghanistan, hardly fits the mold, since Saudi Arabia had more to do with financing, while the Taliban just provided safe haven.

If I had it my way, we'd worry about #4, and secure our borders. #1 has the problem of throwing good money after bad, #2 is what George Washington suggested were the foreign entanglement that we should not do, and #3 is very subjective and if not done by the UN, should not be done.

[Rhydderch Hael]

...When I said a mixture of SWAT and Andy Jackson Taylor, I didn't mean separate people or groups. Perhaps I should have said a cross between Dirty Harry and Andy Jackson Taylor to make it clear that I was speaking of individuals and not of groups. I can see how my reference to SWAT could lead to your conclusion.
--Pete

So, we need S.H.I.E.L.D.

That, or the Mystery Men.

I'd think the quickest, easiest way for North Korea to take out South Korea is to detonate a nuke to deliver an EMP attack, or otherwise knock out South Korea's internet services. You'd end up with either mass suicides or open revolt by the internet addicts.

[--Pete]

Hi,

I'd think the quickest, easiest way for North Korea to take out South Korea is to detonate a nuke to deliver an EMP attack, or otherwise knock out South Korea's internet services. You'd end up with either mass suicides or open revolt by the internet addicts.

That, or introduce a game breaking bug in StarCraft.

--Pete

[Jester]

You'd end up with either mass suicides or open revolt by the internet addicts.

... or it might backfire, and you'd end up facing an army of tactical savants who do not need to eat or sleep for days on end, driven mad and pitiless by the removal of the only thing between themselves and outright sociopathy...

-Jester

[LavCat]

You'd end up with either mass suicides or open revolt by the internet addicts.

... or it might backfire, and you'd end up facing an army of tactical savants who do not need to eat or sleep for days on end, driven mad and pitiless by the removal of the only thing between themselves and outright sociopathy...

-Jester

A particularly violent storm this afternoon took out Comcast for four hours. Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha

[Occhidiangela]

Here's the NKDH: the North Korean Diplomatic Heuristic.

1) Make an agreement not to be crazy anymore, in exchange for nice stuff.
2) Act crazy.
3) Repeat.

As to whether this becomes "Obama's dumb war", I think this is a nonsensical comparison. Obama is not looking to attack North Korea. If NK does not fire the first shot* neither the US nor South Korea is going to pull the trigger. If North Korea does commit to a war, the US would be obligated to defend, not least by the fact that US troops are already on the front lines. That wouldn't be a stupid war, that would be a necessary war.

-Jester

*That is to say, forces a war, rather than just sinking a ship.

I am sorry, Jester, but what in the name of sacred feces do you mean by "Just sinking a ship?"

North Korea already fired the first shot, ask the families of the 48 dead sailors. FWIW, the US got all shiggy with Viet Nam over a lot less, but, this is a different situation. The lead is in Seoul. Whomever suggested that this is Obama's war is, IMO, very mistaken. It is Lee's war, if it is anyone's, though I am sure we'll help if he needs it.

The "stupid" in Obama's current wars, that he took over, is that the timeline for withdrawal in Iraq is slipping. (News article about three weeks ago, that cropped up as the post election violence in Iraq reached its predictable levels. Hopefully, someone in DC has told the Americans who made such commentary to shut up and get with the program).

Supposed to be down to 50K by 31 August. I'd rather see the withdrawal accelerated, but I am not in charge.

Why do I mention this? President Obama has constrained options vis a vis Korea while he leaves American troops stuck in the Iraq tar baby.

Occhi

[Occhidiangela]

Hi,

Personally, I'd love to have Occhi chime in as he's got a better handle on this than all of us.

Than all of us *combined*. Yes. I'd love to see him here more often.

--Pete

The short and sweet is that North Korean "battle of the first salvo" position is semi enviable. They have sufficient tube artillery, which is mid to low tech, to create what Jester called hell on earth in Seoul. Whomever agreed to the lines on the map in 1953 rather missed the boat on how far Seoul ought to be from the border ... but then, maybe they didn't expect the cease fire to be as far as they got.

In re air superiority, I am not as familiar with SK CAP and alert postures, but the NK's are at risk of being Syria to SK's Israel, 1981-1982. SK has integrated air C & C built on our model, with EW and airborne C&C capability that renders the air battle a rather short one. Also on the books are non-trivial interdiction missions and NK SAM disruption/suppression, in which the US air arms figure. Caveat: my info on the Op Plan is some years old.

The question is, does SK C & C break down, or not? If not, their military is competent, well equipped, well trained. They'll handle small unit fighting well enough. North will not play for invasion. They haven't the logistic depth to do that. Their game is to cause enough pain for SK to buckle, with turns the area between the DMZ and about thirty miles south of it into a charnel house.

How tough are South Koreans?

IMO tough enough, but we may find out, for better or worse, pretty soon.

The other question is, how well with NK infiltration work to reduce the effectiveness of the theatre rear/logistics/resupply/air in the opening 48 hours? Don't know, but we do know that doctrinally, infiltration and penetration for those purposes are their MO.

PS: I was thinking of Magi this morning. We are in College Station, son getting all registered and such to become an Aggie this fall. Current major is Nuclear Engineering department, with initial aim at radiological/health aspects of nuclear engineering. I still would rather he went to power generation, but we'll let things play out. He's gotta follow his dream.

Occhi