Shouldnt Bush be impeached for spying on US citize

[Thecla]

Only to comment on a couple of things.

The Slate article is a bit dated regarding the Patriot Act

Yup, there is much water under the bridge in many directions since that article was written, but I still thought it provided an interesting context.

I am not content with FISA being the only legal matter at hand.  The crux of the legal matter is nearly Constitutional

In many ways FISA is irrelevant. The Bush adminstrations seems to claim it can authorize warrantless surveillance of communications concerning terrorist threats that involve US citizens with or without FISA, and seems determined to prove that it can do so without FISA. (Either that, or they are ordering surveillance which is not permitted under FISA; the argument that it's too much bother to get warrants from a virtually 100% compliant secret court is completely bogus.) The ultimate obstruction to this claim is more than nearly consititutional. (But perhaps the constitution should be scrapped also if there's a terrorist with a nuclear bomb; or perhaps those who view the Bush administration as well-intentioned and competent are happy to give them any powers they wish.)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

It is hardly for the executive branch to both order such searches (or surveillance) and, at the same time, declare their constitutionality. But the administration not only seems to reject working with congress, if congress does not simply approve their expanded powers, they also seem to try and avoid any supreme court consideration of their assertions of power, often in secret, despite the general deference of the court to the executive branch in matters of national security.

One final quote from FindLaw analyzing the constitutionality of warrantless electronic surveillance.

Warrantless ''National Security'' Electronic Surveillance .--In Katz v. United States, 151  Justice White sought to preserve for a future case the possibility that in ''national security cases'' electronic surveillance upon the authorization of the President or the Attorney General could be permissible without prior judicial approval. The Executive Branch then asserted the power to wiretap and to ''bug'' in two types of national security situations, against domestic subversion and against foreign intelligence operations, first basing its authority on a theory of ''inherent'' presidential power and then in the Supreme Court withdrawing to the argument that such surveillance was a ''reasonable'' search and seizure and therefore valid under the Fourth Amendment. Unanimously, the Court held that at least in cases of domestic subversive investigations, compliance with the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment was required. 152  Whether or not a search was reasonable, wrote Justice Powell for the Court, was a question which derived much of its answer from the warrant clause; except in a few narrowly circumscribed classes of situations, only those searches conducted pursuant to warrants were reasonable. The Government's duty to preserve the national security did not override the gurarantee that before government could invade the privacy of its citizens it must present to a neutral magistrate evidence sufficient to support issuance of a warrant authorizing that invasion of privacy. 153  This protection was even more needed in ''national security cases'' than in cases of ''ordinary'' crime, the Justice continued, inasmuch as the tendency of government so often is to regard opponents of its policies as a threat and hence to tread in areas protected by the First Amendment as well as by the Fourth. 154  Rejected also was the argument that courts could not appreciate the intricacies of investigations in the area of national security nor preserve the secrecy which is required. 155 

The question of the scope of the President's constitutional powers, if any, remains judicially unsettled. 156 Congress has acted, however, providing for a special court to hear requests for warrants for electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence situations, and permitting the President to authorize warrantless surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information provided that the communications to be monitored are exclusively between or among foreign powers and there is no substantial likelihood any ''United States person'' will be overheard. 15