Shocking Tally of Iraq Civilian Causalities

[Occhidiangela]

"That is the role America fell into when Kofi bailed out after the truck bomb hit the UN office building in Baghdad. Action talks and BS walks, so Kofi walked. Still, he was right on that matter."

Now, really, you can't be blaming the purchase of 26 million pieces of broken mesopotamian pottery on Kofi and the UN, can you?

Pottery (I am guessing you refer to the museum looting that was an inside job) protection during combat cannot and is not a priority military mission, and the politicians did not resource that effort as though it were a high priority. Too damned bad. War breaks things.

The problem of the UN very publicly being kicked out of Iraq by one bomb killed off a significant political support effort. Kofi's decision showed once again how fragile UN efforts are in collective security. This same weakness was shown in Bosnia 1992-1995, so it was no surprise to me. To a certain extent, his hands were tied as I don't think much of anyone (contributing nations) was willing to send more people into Bagdad with bombs on the plate. Risk aversion shows a terrorist or guerilla that he can out gut you. The terrorists or Sunni insurgents, not sure who drove that bomb, guessing it was one of Al Douri's folks, kicked Kofi's and the UN's arse, by intimidation. Sad but true. If you want to suggest Kofi was set up by the Bush course of action on that, you'd have a good point.

Dubya bought that urn eagerly and willingly. Kofi warned him, Colin warned him, millions upon millions of protestors warned him, and yet he went ahead anyway.

The "protestors warning" was irrelevant bullsh**. The hair trigger protest versus the US, cries of wolf since about the mid 50's, render their voice nothing more than sound and fury, hot air, and blatant demagoguery. Many were the same over wrought fools who protested Afghanistan: mostly emotion, little substance.

The dipsticks also protest Kyoto. So what?

The warning of people like Powell, like Zinni, like Webb, like Ron Paul, like Chirac, like Putin. Those warnings were of merit. The warning of a few dozen inside State and CIA, some of whom reisgned in protest, those were warnings of merit. Kofi's reluctance to act, since he can't without the Russians, Chinese, and French anyway, was due to his own powerlessness as a leader. He's not a leader, he's a bureaucrat. Bless him for his good intentions, but he's an empty suit, albeit a gentlemanly empty suit.

Override the security council at your own risk.

There is some truth in that, but you might want to consider that the Security Council cease fire of 1991 had never been complied with, so at any time hostilities could recommence.

Saddam had ignored SC for 12 years. At his own risk. :D Milosovic ignored the SC for a few years, at his own risk. :P

Still, I agree with the spirit of your point that taking the time and effort, indulging in the hard work required to get the big 5 on the SC on board was necessary to keep the UN engaged in the long term rebuilding effort, which IMO would have done a lot for the prospects for success.

The decision was a risk based decision that assumed:

1. Keeping lots of international support for the rebuilding effort.

2. Killing or capturing Saddam early on.

3. Lots of Saddam's inner circle quitting or running or dying.

4. 4th ID coming in from Turkey during the operation. That pincer movement not being possible made a massive differnence in the speed of collapse and the time allowed for certain key leadership to go to ground, and the time to start transition.

5. A quick insertion of Chalabi. (Dumb assumption, he's as big a charlatan as Diem or Bao Di in Viet Nam.)

6. A successful PR/Information campaign. It has been a complete failure since day one.

If the assumptions break, the plan breaks. Those six assumptions broke.

I had my eyes and ears open in the runup to this war. I do remember when you and I discussed many of these same problems. And I seem to recall cautioning anyone who would listen about these problems: Not "what will Iraq look like" but "how many Iraqs will there be?".  Not "how do we spread democracy" but "how do we stop people from being very angry after we blow their country apart?" The line was crossed, much to my dismay, and now the US is stuck.

Yes, indeed, you and I discussed "what will Iraq actuallly look like once the glue that binds it is gone?" We also discussed the very real prospect of "civil war like Yugoslavia's break up." Yup.

I blame Dubya, PNAC, and all the rest of the crew that foisted this hellish situation on the world. The rhetoric was as transparent then as now, when it's all fallen to pieces. But now that we're here? The good outcomes are looking remarkably unlikely. Three states, living in harmony? One state, somehow balancing totally polarized interests (see: constitution referendum results)? A perpetual protectorate, with the money to support such a venture being donated by philanthropic individuals? Good luck with any of that.

The last we can't afford. Dubya and PNAC are certainly culpable, as is the US Congress for it's own "authorize use of force" endorsement. Had the ground work been laid to get no fooling UNSC support, and therefore a lot more buy in from more actors in the rebuilding . . . but it wasn't. That hurt in a dozen different ways.

I smell perpetual, smouldering civil war.  If the continued occupation manages to avoid a larger, regional conflict, then great. But if a big, nasty middle eastern war is in the cards, I doubt even 50 years of occupation would accomplish that. Not on the current budget, anyway.

I do see a civil war, one that I saw and was involved with last year, continuing. If it can be confined to Iraq, that is probably the best that could be hoped for, but that leaves Iraq a lot worse off than under Saddam, doesn't it? Yes. Where it leaves Israel is a more insightful question. ;)

Damned if you do, damned if you don't. 

Not really, there is a third way, even a fourth, none of which were explored with any vigor, nor rigor. The "do nothing straw man" was presented with "here's a course of action" and that is no better than a fool's dilemma. What still kills me, since I have long admired Secretary Powell, is that he went along with the brief to the UN, in light of what we have learned since. He was used, but he allowed himself to be used, maybe through a sense of loyalty. Hard to say.

The "if you don't" was tied to a move to increase Israeli security, a move that allegedly makes Israel more tractable in the over all "roadmap to peace." For better and worse, "Israel secure" is part and parcel of US Mid East policy since 1948, and even moreso since 1973. That is reality. Debate the why if you wish, that has been a consistent policy.

Shouldn't have in the first place.
-Jester
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Certainly not without better assumptions, clearer force to task balancing, listening to General Shinseki and other competent military staffwork, and a lot less "hope as a method."

In the absolute case, both General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Retired (Former CENTCOM Commander, predecessor to General Franks) and former Secretary of the Navy James Webb, would agree with you. If you haven't read any of Webb's books, I suggest "The Emperor's General" and some of his public writings from 2002 to present. And transcripts of his speeches. His latest, "Born Fighting" is excellent, and partly explains where Pres Bush draws his public political power from. Good stuff.

Occhi