04-24-2003, 05:35 PM
1. Basing in Iraq: while there may be pragmatic reasons to have them, as in 'nice to have' the political price is considerable, and to my view too high. It creates an all too easy to exploit excuse for radicals to use as fuel for their fire. What basing rights are needed outside of Kuwait? What basing rights are needed in UAE? What basing rights are needed in Oman?
Given the change in the past 10 years in military strategy, and the once again effectiveness of floating power, what bases are needed when operations are all efforts 'short of land operations?' In short, absent a mutual security agreement vis a vis the Iraq/Iran case, what mutual security threat would bases in Iraq meet thta can't be met by maritime forces now? I don't see one.
2. Oil, in general: OPEC did in 1973 what it did, and should the oil producing states be able to unite again in that regard (in my opinion they are too rich and too busy screwing each other to pull that off) then we can expect economic warfare to begin again. Biggest Difference? More capacity globally than in mid 1970's. I don't see it as a show stopper. Biggest loser is Japan, not the US, to my mind. The problem with an oil embargo is that those who put it in place inflict pain on themselves, particularly as the lack of diversified economies in some of those states makes them as dependent on oil revenue as industrial economies are on oil: how long they can put up with the pain is an interesting variable to speculate on.
3. Export of the Islamic Revolution. An interesting issue, and one where we have learned a lesson in Iran, or have not: engagement, there's an approach to try. Participation in the process, in an open manner. Does that hold risks? Yes. The other approach, vis a vis Iran, hardly worked. Time to try a different tack, and perhaps give support to moderates. :)
Given the change in the past 10 years in military strategy, and the once again effectiveness of floating power, what bases are needed when operations are all efforts 'short of land operations?' In short, absent a mutual security agreement vis a vis the Iraq/Iran case, what mutual security threat would bases in Iraq meet thta can't be met by maritime forces now? I don't see one.
2. Oil, in general: OPEC did in 1973 what it did, and should the oil producing states be able to unite again in that regard (in my opinion they are too rich and too busy screwing each other to pull that off) then we can expect economic warfare to begin again. Biggest Difference? More capacity globally than in mid 1970's. I don't see it as a show stopper. Biggest loser is Japan, not the US, to my mind. The problem with an oil embargo is that those who put it in place inflict pain on themselves, particularly as the lack of diversified economies in some of those states makes them as dependent on oil revenue as industrial economies are on oil: how long they can put up with the pain is an interesting variable to speculate on.
3. Export of the Islamic Revolution. An interesting issue, and one where we have learned a lesson in Iran, or have not: engagement, there's an approach to try. Participation in the process, in an open manner. Does that hold risks? Yes. The other approach, vis a vis Iran, hardly worked. Time to try a different tack, and perhaps give support to moderates. :)
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete