10-25-2004, 07:55 PM
(This post was last modified: 10-25-2004, 08:03 PM by Occhidiangela.)
Ajax,Oct 25 2004, 01:54 AM Wrote:Greetings all. One of my research papers this term involves the European Union. Being geopolitically-minded, I figured I'd write it on security issues; I was also interested because it is generally understood that the EU/EC has had a history of just "declaring" their common defense or outsourcing it to third-party international organizations such as the WEU or NATO. But recent years have shown a significant development of EU security structure--namely, the Rapid Reaction Force under EU control and not necessarily a part of, or dependent on, NATO.Â
I'm thinking of writing about the quest for European autonomy from the US on strategic defense. As far as I understand it, the issue is defined by several characteristics:Â
1) US dominance of NATO as a result of the US military advantage in technology, experience, logistics, and funding,
2) EU desire to implement their own strategic plans and the implied need, to use NATO assets as component to their non-NATO, EU OPS,
3) Europe has been given large-scale security for "pennies on the dollar" (i.e. at a great savings) by US force overrepresentation in NATO,
4) the US desire, or need, for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of its security, evinced by
5) Europe's apparent unwillingness (apart from Turkey, Greece, the UK and maybe France) to spend the money necessary to achieve this. (I can't stress this enough; no matter what the outcome, Europe will have to spend more money on defense and it doesn't seem willing to do so.)Â
So, where do you all come in?Â
I'd like those interested to assemble these parameters into an understanding of the situation and/or prediction of the future arrangement in Europe or between Europe and the US. Now, don't think I'm being lazy, because I have already got a pretty good idea on my own paper topic (which I will post below.) But, I am hoping to take advantage of this forum's international membership to supply perspectives from the other side of the Atlantic. Or Pacific, if you happen to float that way. (American lurkers are also encouraged to reply, I'll listen to anyone's point of view!)Â
And finally, let it be known that if this thread is an irritation to the general public it shall be nuked, or at least quietly pass from the rolls due to lack of interest.Â
Many thanks,
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NATO experience, personal, tells me the following.
Security operations, such as UNPROFOR 1991-1995, were abysmal failures due to failures in leadership, not for lack of skill or resources on the ground. The ability of the Serb factions to work between the seams kept that civil war going on longer than it need be, since the UN's leadership was, in a word, ineffective.
The EU has two problems to resolve if they want EFFECTIVE multilateral security organs that can operate outside of the NATO structure. I worked on a few mid 90's working groups that addressed some of these issues, many of which revolved around big backbone comms connectivity in the Southern Region.
1. Deciding when they (EU) don't want to operate with the only A team around. There will be times that such will appeal to the governments involved. The rest of the time, playing with the A team will enhance their security objectives and likelihood of successful action.
2. Paying for a capability that works, and investing in the training that makes the force effective when called upon. That ain't cheap, as mentioned above. The lack of will to spend the dough has been a problem in Europe since the early 1980's.
3. Leadership. The one significant shortcoming in European politics at present is lack of leadership. Too many chiefs, not enough Indians, though as bureaucrats and consensus builders, Europeans score many points. Trouble is, when you get to applying armed force to solve a problem, one requires decisiveness for success. That is in short supply. Absence of this element will doom any number of missions to failure. The professionalism and talent currently resident in the peacekeeping focused forces of Europe, about which I have nothing but good things to say, will not always translate into effective combat capability in more dire scenarios.
The ESDI (European Security Defenense Initiative, probably has a new name now) has always been predicated on: creible force, massivley modernized comms, and an increase in medium and heavy lift to wean European Security from the American nipple. The investment in lift is coming, comms perhaps, regionally dependent. Credible force is, at present, limited to UK, Dutch, and Turkish (and Aussie - non NATO-) forces.
The others have not been very effective at winning anything lately, or demonstrating winning qualities. A few successes will go a long way to restoring their credibility: credibility adds to the introduction of forces a deterrent element that lack thereof does not allow. Building that credibility will require risk, leadership, and decisiveness. I personally hope that it turns out that way, since I want to see our own % GDP for defense reduced in the long term.
My more recent experience with the ISAF involvement in Afghanistan says . . . lack of decisiveness and inability to take risks in the field, without inane deliberation, is still a critical liability, and an obstacle to success. Timeliness is a key element to decision making in tactical environments.
I aint holding my breath, and hope that Europe will grow a sack before it becomes demographically Muslim.
Occhi
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete