To Americans...

[Occhidiangela]

The oil for food was, once again, a discreet Security Council action that was aimed at lessening the embargoes impact on the Iraqi population while the UN dealt with Hussein's regime, and its failure to live up to both resolutions and the cease fire agreement.

How the hell do you infer that I think it was a bad idea? It was the best possible approach to the fact that embargoes, which tend to hurt democracies way more than dictatorships since democratic governments are accountable to the people and dictators are not, was the only measure of suasion that the Security Council would agree upon, and is consistent with UN Charter guidelines on how humanitarian materials can be exceptions to a general trade embargo. As a general rule, non violent sanctions, such as a trade embargo, are preferred where practicable to military force. (See how US trade sanctions in 1940-41 in response to Japanese aggression in China since 1931 did any good!) The problem is, they are rarely effective where the leadership is indifferent to its populations needs: that is shown historically, except that I would say that OPEC, not a UN body, had a real effect on the US with it oil embargo, in the short term, where second and third order effects created long term damage to the economy. Without that embargo, some suggest that the Stagflation of the 1970's would not have been as severe, though other measures, such as the floating of the dollar in 1969, had a profound impact as well.

Back to the 'oil-for food.'

The idea was: that rather than let Hussein administer the program, wherein he could not be trusted to spend the money where it was needed, on food and medicine per the agreed position, TO WHICH THE US and the whole security council WAS A PARTY, an international body would ensure that revenues were allocated strictly to food and medicine and NOT armaments. Now, I would suggest that the Palaces/C2 bunkers that Saddam built in the past 10 years hardly qualify as 'humanitarian efforts.' The program has been a less than spectacular success, in that the application has hardly had the desired effect.

And about 'glad you admit' about the multinational nature of the sanctions: get a grip.

The problem is that the level of support in 1991 was grossly diluted by 1996-1997. Nations who had been strong supporters of keeping the sanctions while the UN got about its disarmament processes slowly but surely lost interest. The list of players slowly but surely got smaller, which reflects badly on the UN Secretary General, as well as the Prime Minister of France and Russia's president, who were two of the loudest voices in the mid-late '90's to stop sancitons even though the UN arms reduction process, to which Saddam's government signed up, was not completed satisfactorily. That dilution of UN Security Council resolve, by two of the Five major members, is one of the seeds of today's 'state of play.'

Insofar as the "ICC," etc, were the US to sign that, no Congress in this nation would allow a single US Soldier to participate in any UN peace enforcement, or peacekeeping operation, due to the issues addressed in some other posts. Our laws govern how our soldiers are trained, equipped, and administered, to include the maintenance of Constitutional rights. No American serviceman forfeits his rights upon swearing the oath.

Oh, and must ask you: how are you going to get Saddam to Den Hague to stand trial? Tell me how that can actually be accomplished without forcing him from power. He is not Pinochet. The Arab League approached him recently, asking that he retire for the greater good. You note that he declined the offer. Talk is cheap.

In re Israel's pre-emptive strike, thanks for the reading material. :) That was a trip down memory lane. :o But you do make me chuckle.

However, Israel's critics pointed out that Iraq was a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allowed international inspections of the nuclear facility, while Israel itself refused to sign the treaty, refused inspections of its nuclear facility, and was widely believed to have a large nuclear arsenal.

The same leader in Iraq who obstructs current international inspection processes now was in charge then. Not bloody likely that the critics were remotely close to reality with their observations. I do agree that the Israeli position is most unhelpful, and given the time frame, no help to US-USSR relationships at all.

But look at Israel's strategic position. Look at the map. Look at the size of Israel. Consider the effect of a single nuclear weapon. Like any sovereign state, Israel took action to secure its self, and I might remind you that in 1981, the Arab nations, with the significant exception of Egypt, were still 'at war' with Israel. Do you remember the 1982 air battle over Lebanon where Israeli Air Force cleared the sky of some 80+ Syrian warplanes?

Israel, which I assume has nuclear capability, was not as willing as US/USSR to trust a MAD structure as a way to balance strength and threat of someone pushing a button, partly because they to this day will not admit to that. (Yet another thorn in the side of Washington's Mideast Policy, and no help to Mideast peace.). Unilke the rich Europeans, Israel was not protected by an Article 5 assurance per the NATO treaty. Their situation is NOT identical to that of the Europeans and Americans who criticize the Israeli efforts toward their national security.

Unless you just woke up, the battle of the first salvo is the modern age's fundamental military reality for small nations. Unlike the US and USSR, India and China, they have no strategic depth. It is 'come as you are.' And of course, a nuclear battle of the first salvo on a state as small as Israel would end it, even if as they melted they could know that their own nukes would wreak some havoc. That scenario has been exaclty what the entire non-proliferation effort has been trying to prevent, with mixed or no success: see Pakistan and India and their recent tension for a good example.

That said, the attack was most certainly an act that did nothing to promote peace in the Middle East. On that you and I will most definitely agree. Of course, you appear to ignore that the Cold War was in full swing at that time, and all of what happened in the Mid East must be seen through the lens of 'the great game' that was being played out by the Eagle and the Bear. You do remember the Cold War, right, the era us old farts grew up in, hoping on a daily basis that no idiot would push 'the red button'?

You also appear to ignore, again, the practical shortcomings of the 1968 nuclear non proliferation treaty, to which Iraq was a signatory. (As was Israel, as your quote points out.) Now, if Israel is to trust the UN to take care of the fact that Hussein was in blatant violation of that treaty, with French support (no surprise, they had adopted in late 1960's an independent nuclear posture) and the UN's track record (remember, SC veto paralyzed a great deal of potential multilateral action in those days) in actually producing results was abysmal (see for that matter the Occupied territory issues since 1967), what would you do if you were Israel? The bottom line entering assumption was that Israel wished to continue its existence. With that underlying assumption, work your way down a decision tree when your concerns are not the most important agenda items on the plates of the Large Powers. Were they to trust 'the big boys' to look after their interests? Were they to wait until the mushroom clouds bloomed over Haifa? That was the choice that the leaders at the time felt that they were faced with.

Through President Carter's efforts, they had just cut a deal with Egypt, which got Sadat assassinated (there you go, an Arab tries for a peaceful solution and look at what he got for his troubles!) yet none of the other major Arab powers were willing to move forward in the same direction: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, you name it, under terms that Irael was able to trust. (Go back to the map, and the disparity in geography and the range of modern artillery. Apply your ruler and consiser North Korea vs Seuol and tube artillery.) Now, the why's of that are worthy of a few volumes, but that was the state of play.

Was the US pissed off? Hell yes, and justifiably so. Thanks for your Inman: tidbit I have great respect for Admiran Inman. That Isreali strike was without a doubt a huge risk to the US-USSR detente, as the Cold War played out its course in the arena of the Middle East. It was exactly the sort of wild card play that both Moscow and Washington feared would be a trigger for hostilities erupting.

Please try to read what I write and comprehend it. I have considerable experience in what embargoes and blockades are all about, and I once again find your misinterpretation of what I present evidence that you have little to no depth on the subject.