03-24-2003, 01:43 PM
In the months before the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the abount of debate as to how and how much was immense within US Military circles. The decision to take the VIIth coprs from Germany to Kuwait/Saudi Arabia and then home, versus just home, (our troop reductions were just beginning) was the subject of months of planning and feedback between CentCom and the JCS. The restraint shown once the ground war started, since Iran was the more important long term 'threat' as seen from DC, was based on some rather mixed long term predictions as to what the post War Gulf would look like.
Powell is an adherent to the Weinberger doctrine, which he helped implement. There are six critical considerations before committing US Troops, I need to go back and look them up, I don't have them ingrained in memory any longer as that doctrine was tossed out the window by the Clinton Administration.
There is some justifiable questioning of G.Bush senior, Powell, and Cheney in re their pressure to "stop the war after 100 hours' and their being influenced by the images on CNN. The pressure they put on General Schwarzkopf was considerable. And so, the success was not followed up for a variety of reasons, some of which had to do with considering the feelings of Arab allies, and George Bush (SR)'s belief that the UN, now that he had galvanized it, would continue to be an effective agent of international will in the region once the shooting stopped. He believed in the UN, as did his successor, and it let both him his successor down in re the desarmament protocols. He f**ked up, he trusted them.
Powell's reluctance to go to war back then was a combination of his own experiences and his views on the Weinberger doctrine, or that is how I read it.
Given his background, I understand his reservations. I looked at the enrivonment, and fact that the attacking force has much tougher chore in combat, and I too was worried. To claim that his plan would have been worse is to completely misunderstand how our system works. The plan executed, the plan developed by the men in CentCom, was briefed and approved, and then resourced and backed, by the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense. The planning process examined a bunch of options, and success was determined to be more likely via the plan that was adopted. Again, the process worked, and Powell, like any good senior leader, understood that he did not have a monopoly on good ideas. The better idea prevailed, in the long run, which is how the system is supposed to work.
Powell is an adherent to the Weinberger doctrine, which he helped implement. There are six critical considerations before committing US Troops, I need to go back and look them up, I don't have them ingrained in memory any longer as that doctrine was tossed out the window by the Clinton Administration.
There is some justifiable questioning of G.Bush senior, Powell, and Cheney in re their pressure to "stop the war after 100 hours' and their being influenced by the images on CNN. The pressure they put on General Schwarzkopf was considerable. And so, the success was not followed up for a variety of reasons, some of which had to do with considering the feelings of Arab allies, and George Bush (SR)'s belief that the UN, now that he had galvanized it, would continue to be an effective agent of international will in the region once the shooting stopped. He believed in the UN, as did his successor, and it let both him his successor down in re the desarmament protocols. He f**ked up, he trusted them.
Powell's reluctance to go to war back then was a combination of his own experiences and his views on the Weinberger doctrine, or that is how I read it.
Given his background, I understand his reservations. I looked at the enrivonment, and fact that the attacking force has much tougher chore in combat, and I too was worried. To claim that his plan would have been worse is to completely misunderstand how our system works. The plan executed, the plan developed by the men in CentCom, was briefed and approved, and then resourced and backed, by the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense. The planning process examined a bunch of options, and success was determined to be more likely via the plan that was adopted. Again, the process worked, and Powell, like any good senior leader, understood that he did not have a monopoly on good ideas. The better idea prevailed, in the long run, which is how the system is supposed to work.
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete