03-20-2003, 09:59 PM
Hi,
In international dealings, as in so much else, the cost/benefit analysis applies. I don't need to tell you that. You ask if interference in the internal workings of a country should be just a matter of the risk. I think that, for the same reward, a lower risk makes the course of action more palatable. If the risk is nearly nil, than any slight perceived reward is sufficient.
In the case of Iraq, not only is the risk greater than in the Balkans (both militarily and economically), but the situation is not as clear cut. There is no civil war in Iraq at present. There is no "ethnic cleansing". There is no group whose life and rights need defending *at present*. So, either we are invading Iraq as retribution for past deeds or as a precautionary measure for future deeds. If for past deeds, why didn't we act then? Why wait till now? And how does our acting now address those past deeds? If as a precautionary measure, how probable is the need for our action? How imminent was the danger? How likely was it that diplomatic means, backed by a clear willingness to go to war if the diplomacy failed, would have achieved our objectives?
I still think that we took the right course, albeit perhaps too rapidly and definitely for the wrong reasons. However, if our intelligence proves to have been faulty (or invented by people who wished a war), then even the valid reasons will have been false. If the intelligence wasn't as near certain as intelligence could ever be, then we are at fault for not waiting, both to verify what we thought we knew and, incidentally, to give other means a chance to work.
I still support this war on the basis of the evidence presented, but only marginally. If it turns out that the American people were lied to, either because the intelligence presented was false or because it wasn't verified, then I will join the ranks calling for both the impeachment of Bush and his trial as an international terrorist. And that, too, is part of the risk/reward structure.
--Pete
In international dealings, as in so much else, the cost/benefit analysis applies. I don't need to tell you that. You ask if interference in the internal workings of a country should be just a matter of the risk. I think that, for the same reward, a lower risk makes the course of action more palatable. If the risk is nearly nil, than any slight perceived reward is sufficient.
In the case of Iraq, not only is the risk greater than in the Balkans (both militarily and economically), but the situation is not as clear cut. There is no civil war in Iraq at present. There is no "ethnic cleansing". There is no group whose life and rights need defending *at present*. So, either we are invading Iraq as retribution for past deeds or as a precautionary measure for future deeds. If for past deeds, why didn't we act then? Why wait till now? And how does our acting now address those past deeds? If as a precautionary measure, how probable is the need for our action? How imminent was the danger? How likely was it that diplomatic means, backed by a clear willingness to go to war if the diplomacy failed, would have achieved our objectives?
I still think that we took the right course, albeit perhaps too rapidly and definitely for the wrong reasons. However, if our intelligence proves to have been faulty (or invented by people who wished a war), then even the valid reasons will have been false. If the intelligence wasn't as near certain as intelligence could ever be, then we are at fault for not waiting, both to verify what we thought we knew and, incidentally, to give other means a chance to work.
I still support this war on the basis of the evidence presented, but only marginally. If it turns out that the American people were lied to, either because the intelligence presented was false or because it wasn't verified, then I will join the ranks calling for both the impeachment of Bush and his trial as an international terrorist. And that, too, is part of the risk/reward structure.
--Pete
How big was the aquarium in Noah's ark?