09-05-2003, 09:29 PM
(This post was last modified: 09-05-2003, 09:33 PM by Occhidiangela.)
You can be a Naval Power without winning the Naval campaign.
In 1803, our frigates were able to dictate certain activities on the high seas along the Barbary Coast in a finite time and space until a political aim was achieved. That is localized command of the Sea: Command of a sea area finite in duration, and lasting as long as the mission.
Sea Control? No, we did not have the resources that in 1803, nor in 1812. We could in 1812 defend a single harbor, or open or close a harbor here and there, thus exercising "localized command of the sea" but we had not the resources to exercise a more general mission of Sea Control versus that opponent: The Naval Power. That had to wait for the Civil War era and a less capable foe, the CSA. CSA could only exercise localized sea denial due to its resource limitations.
Frigates strategic relevance? Significant. I must disagree with you on that point. Ever heard of Mahan and Corbetts discussions of a Fleet in Being? There is also the critical political element of any victory being good for one's side. They did more than that, in that they were able to locally contest command of the sea, though due to resource limitations, not over a borad area. Had they been irrelevant, the RN would have approached Maritime Dominance: complete and uncontested use of the sea lanes. That is not shown by the historical record, though on the balance the RN certainly had their way more often than not.
I realize that I am using very fine, even arcanely doctrinal, definitions for my terms here, which may be a bit out of place on a general discussion board. In broad terms:
Maritime Dominance (I am not sure anyone has ever achieved this)
Command of the Sea
Sea Control
Sea Denial
Local command of the sea
Would be the heirarchy I would assign to the levels of exercising maritime power. It gets further complicated when you mix in air power as a factor: for example, you can use land based aircraft and missiles to exercise Sea Denial, particularly in narrow waterways.
In 1803, our frigates were able to dictate certain activities on the high seas along the Barbary Coast in a finite time and space until a political aim was achieved. That is localized command of the Sea: Command of a sea area finite in duration, and lasting as long as the mission.
Sea Control? No, we did not have the resources that in 1803, nor in 1812. We could in 1812 defend a single harbor, or open or close a harbor here and there, thus exercising "localized command of the sea" but we had not the resources to exercise a more general mission of Sea Control versus that opponent: The Naval Power. That had to wait for the Civil War era and a less capable foe, the CSA. CSA could only exercise localized sea denial due to its resource limitations.
Frigates strategic relevance? Significant. I must disagree with you on that point. Ever heard of Mahan and Corbetts discussions of a Fleet in Being? There is also the critical political element of any victory being good for one's side. They did more than that, in that they were able to locally contest command of the sea, though due to resource limitations, not over a borad area. Had they been irrelevant, the RN would have approached Maritime Dominance: complete and uncontested use of the sea lanes. That is not shown by the historical record, though on the balance the RN certainly had their way more often than not.
I realize that I am using very fine, even arcanely doctrinal, definitions for my terms here, which may be a bit out of place on a general discussion board. In broad terms:
Maritime Dominance (I am not sure anyone has ever achieved this)
Command of the Sea
Sea Control
Sea Denial
Local command of the sea
Would be the heirarchy I would assign to the levels of exercising maritime power. It gets further complicated when you mix in air power as a factor: for example, you can use land based aircraft and missiles to exercise Sea Denial, particularly in narrow waterways.
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete