06-24-2003, 02:01 PM
D-Dave, stick to the basics.
Why Now versus Why Not?
That was the Opposing set of questions that confronted a decision to go to war in early 2003. The weather was a factor in timing, as were cycles of Muslim Holy days, but many folks read even more factors into the decision as to 'why now.' One had to be the U.S. election cycle. It has to do with the difference between doing something to improve a situation, and waiting around and hoping that things will change for the better. Given a preference to change a bad situation, it was far easier to get support from both sides of the aisle in Congress in 2002-2003 than in 2003-2004 when folks are running for re election. Also, the emotional momentum of 9-11, a factor in popular support, was certainly used whether or not a one to one correspondence made any "pure" sense: which to many folks, it did not. Politics, and nothing new under the sun.
The point I keep trying to make here is that the war part of a far bigger political probelm, which is the stability of the Middle East as a region. It is not just about Saddam Hussein, though he is a handy poster child for some.
The ironic thing is he plays by a different set of assumptions. His aim is to survive and reatin as much power as he can. The odds that he was in Bagdad the night of the first strike is small. The odds that it was he who was in that restaurant are debatable. The odds that he, a survivor of numerous assassination plots, was elsewhere are immense.
He too had a plan, and it had nothing to do with military victory. He knew he'd get his ass kicked. His play, I suggest, had to do with political victory. And political victory is more likely, for him, if a drawn out guerilla action in Iraq makes the U.S. involvement painful enough for there to be a gut check in Washington a few years down stream, particularly if Pres Bush is not re elected. He well knows the history of American volatility of purpose, and is banking on that. So the challenge is to have the will to follow through, to "win the peace."
But back to "Why Now?" After 12 years of UN fiddling around that made a little progress on the '90 day time line' from the 1991 ceasefire, and which really ended in 1998, Saddam was still using such leverage as he could in the political realm. He had been exploiting the rift in the old Coalition as regards sanctions to break those commercial restrictions without full compliance. Politically, he was making progress. If you fast forward about three years, and find the sanctions lifted without full compliance, what then? The policy of containment becomes a complete failure. And not only is there no resolution, but the re emergence of an obstacle to the extremely difficult Mid East peace process.
Sponsorship of terrorism, particularly in Israel/Palestine, though to date he has not yet been shown to have actively supported Al Qaeda, and I doubt if that will ever be shown. The point is, Al Qaeda is not the only terror organ targeted by the 'War on Terrror.' Simpleton's may wish to apply that logic, but it completely misses the policy undertaken shortly after 9-11.
The best reason to take Saddam out, his being a Baathist-Stalinist prick, was the hardest to sell politically to anyone, if it even could have been: any number of allies in the region also have, to a greater or lesser extent, autocratic governments.
Europe lost millions to autocratic jerks in the 30's and 40's, and millions more died during the war that ousted a few of them. Europe is now a better place, thanks to intervention by the U.S. and the Marshall Plan, and a policy of containment vis a vis the Stalinists.
Can a similar approach be taken in the Middle East? Maybe, maybe not. Cookie cutter solutions rarely work out.
Is it plausible that Iraq got of relatively cheaply in comparison to Europe, though?
Maybe, but I concede that the models don't necessarily translate all that well. In any case, we won't know for at least 5, probably 10, years. What you can take to the bank, though, is that without change there would be no prospect for a change in Iraq, for the average electrician in Mosul, the Mid East peace process would continue to be obstructed by the Baghdad regime, and the various other states in the Middle East would be . . . insecure.
The Why Now question has been answered, with mixed reception, as well as the Why Not, also to mixed reviews but the key question NOW is:
What Next?
Will the will sustain, in the U.S., to 'bear any burden' to make sure that the war was not wasted effort, not an exercise in bloodletting for no beneficial long term outcome?
That needs answering, and my crystal ball is cloudy on that subject.
Why Now versus Why Not?
That was the Opposing set of questions that confronted a decision to go to war in early 2003. The weather was a factor in timing, as were cycles of Muslim Holy days, but many folks read even more factors into the decision as to 'why now.' One had to be the U.S. election cycle. It has to do with the difference between doing something to improve a situation, and waiting around and hoping that things will change for the better. Given a preference to change a bad situation, it was far easier to get support from both sides of the aisle in Congress in 2002-2003 than in 2003-2004 when folks are running for re election. Also, the emotional momentum of 9-11, a factor in popular support, was certainly used whether or not a one to one correspondence made any "pure" sense: which to many folks, it did not. Politics, and nothing new under the sun.
The point I keep trying to make here is that the war part of a far bigger political probelm, which is the stability of the Middle East as a region. It is not just about Saddam Hussein, though he is a handy poster child for some.
The ironic thing is he plays by a different set of assumptions. His aim is to survive and reatin as much power as he can. The odds that he was in Bagdad the night of the first strike is small. The odds that it was he who was in that restaurant are debatable. The odds that he, a survivor of numerous assassination plots, was elsewhere are immense.
He too had a plan, and it had nothing to do with military victory. He knew he'd get his ass kicked. His play, I suggest, had to do with political victory. And political victory is more likely, for him, if a drawn out guerilla action in Iraq makes the U.S. involvement painful enough for there to be a gut check in Washington a few years down stream, particularly if Pres Bush is not re elected. He well knows the history of American volatility of purpose, and is banking on that. So the challenge is to have the will to follow through, to "win the peace."
But back to "Why Now?" After 12 years of UN fiddling around that made a little progress on the '90 day time line' from the 1991 ceasefire, and which really ended in 1998, Saddam was still using such leverage as he could in the political realm. He had been exploiting the rift in the old Coalition as regards sanctions to break those commercial restrictions without full compliance. Politically, he was making progress. If you fast forward about three years, and find the sanctions lifted without full compliance, what then? The policy of containment becomes a complete failure. And not only is there no resolution, but the re emergence of an obstacle to the extremely difficult Mid East peace process.
Sponsorship of terrorism, particularly in Israel/Palestine, though to date he has not yet been shown to have actively supported Al Qaeda, and I doubt if that will ever be shown. The point is, Al Qaeda is not the only terror organ targeted by the 'War on Terrror.' Simpleton's may wish to apply that logic, but it completely misses the policy undertaken shortly after 9-11.
The best reason to take Saddam out, his being a Baathist-Stalinist prick, was the hardest to sell politically to anyone, if it even could have been: any number of allies in the region also have, to a greater or lesser extent, autocratic governments.
Europe lost millions to autocratic jerks in the 30's and 40's, and millions more died during the war that ousted a few of them. Europe is now a better place, thanks to intervention by the U.S. and the Marshall Plan, and a policy of containment vis a vis the Stalinists.
Can a similar approach be taken in the Middle East? Maybe, maybe not. Cookie cutter solutions rarely work out.
Is it plausible that Iraq got of relatively cheaply in comparison to Europe, though?
Maybe, but I concede that the models don't necessarily translate all that well. In any case, we won't know for at least 5, probably 10, years. What you can take to the bank, though, is that without change there would be no prospect for a change in Iraq, for the average electrician in Mosul, the Mid East peace process would continue to be obstructed by the Baghdad regime, and the various other states in the Middle East would be . . . insecure.
The Why Now question has been answered, with mixed reception, as well as the Why Not, also to mixed reviews but the key question NOW is:
What Next?
Will the will sustain, in the U.S., to 'bear any burden' to make sure that the war was not wasted effort, not an exercise in bloodletting for no beneficial long term outcome?
That needs answering, and my crystal ball is cloudy on that subject.
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete