04-27-2008, 08:14 PM
Risk Analysis in the 1970's . . . . is the subject of this post.
I also know enough about the real world to know that a lot of risk analysis is faulty because of underlying false assumptions. I would also venture that some of the RA from the 1970's was based on "not enough data".
The risk assessments we were fed in the 1970's would have us have one accident in, what was it, every million reactor-years or some such fantasy. I would wager that the point that TMI got to was supposed to only happen once every hundred-thousand reactor-years...
...and yet, with only a small number of reactors, and a small number of years, we got to that point. Just unlucky, and it would never happen again? I doubt it. Not when "human factors" play such a part.
We were lied to. Oh, I'm sure the people who developed the risk assessments believed them. They didn't think they were lying. But it was still wrong. And that is why new construction stopped in 1978. . . until safety improved.
And then it wasn't just small incremental changes in monitoring, it was the whole shift that errors, instead of leading to meltdown, led to breakdown instead. That is a huge difference, because the penalty of an error is reduced from a humongo negative (my very technical term) to a mild, even acceptable negative. If you have four pebble mini-reactors, instead of one huge active-controlled one, who cares if one of them breaks down? Oopsie, just get it going again, no harm done (except the lost power).
As for North Anna, your question is laughable. If I'm the emotional one, the one who can't understand risk, how come YOU are the one asking a question that has the implicit assumption that N. Anna should have blown up by now? Do you really think I'm that stupid? Evidently you do.
I'm talking about the risk of having a whole country full of "generation II" reactors for a century and you're asking me why a certain one hasn't had an accident (that we know about)? That's not a trick question, that is a foolish question. So either you are a fool or you believe me to be one. Heh. I can guess which one. So, anytime I say anything, you will be there to either disagree or give welcome to being enlightened; if I dig up my source, you will just say it's repetitive. I didn't catch whether you were saying SciAm is a good source or not. Please let me know; if not, could you please kindly send a suitable replacement?
As for the Navy, their record is commendable. I would bet that they stick to the procedure scripts more closely than civilians do and thus have less issue with human factors. Maybe the Navy should run the inland power plants. Of course, I do wonder that if they did have any mishaps (that weren't externally obvious) if the American public would hear about them.
So .. I am the one who switched my opinion on the issue, and yet you accuse me of being hard-headed, just because I won't backdate as far as you. Our difference is about the "when" things were "safe enough". And you are being just as repetitive, if not more. Just as repetitive, if not more. If not more.
-V
ps. Do you know that ostriches really don't bury their heads in the sand? They put their heads down near the ground to get a closer look, and to protect their offspring.
Quote:Van, here's a mental exercise for you: consider the entire population of operationg nuclear plants, circa 1978, in the US alone, and the number up for licensing, and try to sell anyone who isn't paranoid that it wasn't "safe enough." (I commented in the other thread on one I am familiar with, the North Anna plant in Virginia. )I know enough about mathematics (my area) to understand risk analysis.
I also know enough about the real world to know that a lot of risk analysis is faulty because of underlying false assumptions. I would also venture that some of the RA from the 1970's was based on "not enough data".
The risk assessments we were fed in the 1970's would have us have one accident in, what was it, every million reactor-years or some such fantasy. I would wager that the point that TMI got to was supposed to only happen once every hundred-thousand reactor-years...
...and yet, with only a small number of reactors, and a small number of years, we got to that point. Just unlucky, and it would never happen again? I doubt it. Not when "human factors" play such a part.
We were lied to. Oh, I'm sure the people who developed the risk assessments believed them. They didn't think they were lying. But it was still wrong. And that is why new construction stopped in 1978. . . until safety improved.
And then it wasn't just small incremental changes in monitoring, it was the whole shift that errors, instead of leading to meltdown, led to breakdown instead. That is a huge difference, because the penalty of an error is reduced from a humongo negative (my very technical term) to a mild, even acceptable negative. If you have four pebble mini-reactors, instead of one huge active-controlled one, who cares if one of them breaks down? Oopsie, just get it going again, no harm done (except the lost power).
As for North Anna, your question is laughable. If I'm the emotional one, the one who can't understand risk, how come YOU are the one asking a question that has the implicit assumption that N. Anna should have blown up by now? Do you really think I'm that stupid? Evidently you do.
I'm talking about the risk of having a whole country full of "generation II" reactors for a century and you're asking me why a certain one hasn't had an accident (that we know about)? That's not a trick question, that is a foolish question. So either you are a fool or you believe me to be one. Heh. I can guess which one. So, anytime I say anything, you will be there to either disagree or give welcome to being enlightened; if I dig up my source, you will just say it's repetitive. I didn't catch whether you were saying SciAm is a good source or not. Please let me know; if not, could you please kindly send a suitable replacement?
As for the Navy, their record is commendable. I would bet that they stick to the procedure scripts more closely than civilians do and thus have less issue with human factors. Maybe the Navy should run the inland power plants. Of course, I do wonder that if they did have any mishaps (that weren't externally obvious) if the American public would hear about them.
So .. I am the one who switched my opinion on the issue, and yet you accuse me of being hard-headed, just because I won't backdate as far as you. Our difference is about the "when" things were "safe enough". And you are being just as repetitive, if not more. Just as repetitive, if not more. If not more.
-V
ps. Do you know that ostriches really don't bury their heads in the sand? They put their heads down near the ground to get a closer look, and to protect their offspring.